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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the meaning and possible effects on New Zealand law of 
section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights. Section 25(c) provides for the right to the 
presumption of innocence. In particular, this paper concentrates on the effect of the 
right to the presumption of innocence on provisions and rules of law which reverse 
the standard onus of proof by placing a burden on an accused person. 
The right to the presumption of innocence is widely acknowledged, but its precise 
effect varies in different jurisdictions. The first part of the paper sets out the 
meaning of the right to the presumption of innocence, and the approach to its 
application, that it is urged should be adopted by New Zealand courts. Part II 
comprises brief overviews of the different approaches adopted in other jurisdictions. 
This is not intended to be a comprehensive study of the right in each jurisdiction, 
but should inform the reader of the general effect the right has, and how the right 
is applied. 
The final part of this paper sets out examples of how the right to the presumption 
of innocence can be used to argue that specific situations in New Zealand in which 
a burden is placed on an accused, infringe section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights. 
The paper is intended to make readers aware of the manner in which this section 
can be used, and of the important role it can, and should, play in shaping New 
Zealand law in future. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 21,500 words. 
THE RIGHT TO THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF 
SECTION 2S(c), NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 
ON RULES AND PROVISIONS REVERSING BURDENS OF PROOF 
INTRODUCTION 
The right to be presumed innocent is a widely recognised principle in western legal 
systems, which has been described as "fundamental to the protection of human 
rights".1 "The presumption of innocence" is a trite phrase that is deceptive in its 
simplicity. In fact the practical effects of this widely acclaimed right are far from 
universally agreed upon. 
Prior to the enactment of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ("Bill of 
Rights"), Lord Sankey's famous dictum from DPP v Woolmington represented the 
position at common law in New Zealand:2 
Throughout the web of the English criminal law one golden thread is always to be seen, that 
it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt subject to what I have already said 
as to the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory exception .... No matter what the 
charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the 
prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be 
entertained. 
The right to be presumed innocent has now been given statutory force in section 
25(c) of the Bill of Rights. 
Despite Lord Sankey's renowned pronouncement, it has been noted by many 
commentators3 that this norm of criminal law has become subject to an 
. . 
mcreasmg 
2 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13(21) on Article 
14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: (1989) 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.l. 
[1935] AC 426, 481-482. 
Public Issues Committee, Auckland District Law Society, "The Presumption of 
Innocence" 27 /5/86, 4; G. Orchard, "The Golden Thread - Somewhat Frayed" 
(1988) 6 Otago Law Review, 615, 637. 
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2 The Right to the Presumption of Innocence 
number of exceptions, to the point where one English commentator has been driven 
to observe:4 
... the golden thread has become tarnished. [The] law now so frequently imposes on a defendant 
the burden of proving a particular defence that it cannot be asserted with confidence whether 
the hallowed presumption of innocence or the disowned presumption of guilt is the dominant 
principle - which in reality is the rule and which the exception ... 
In this paper the right to be presumed innocent is examined to discover whether the 
inclusion of that right in the Bill of Rights will affect provisions and rules which 
reverse an onus of proof in the laws of New Zealand. In order to ascertain the 
answer to this question, it is first necessary to determine what the right means, when 
it applies, and when and if it is permissible to limit the right. 
This paper sets out an approach to the meaning and application of the right that it 
is recommended should be adopted by New Zealand courts; and also provides an 
overview of the varying approaches taken in a number of other jurisdictions. 
A vital point that underlies this paper is the fact that the Bill of Rights is an Act to 
affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (the "Covenant") and that section 25( c) is designed to give effect 
to Article 14(2) of the Covenant. Accordingly the meaning and approach adopted 
by New Zealand courts cannot result in less protection to an accused than he or she 
is entitled to under the Covenant. 
The paper is divided into three principal parts. In the first part I discuss the 
approach that should be adopted by New Zealand courts when they come to 
determine the effect of this section on New Zealand law. I begin by setting out an 
analytical framework upon which individual questions about breach of the 
presumption of innocence should be answered. Having done this I go on to discuss 
when and how the right to the presumption of innocence should be applied. The 
discussion in this part provides an informed background for analysis of the varying 
approaches to the right that have been adopted in other jurisdictions. Part II 
includes overviews of the approaches adopted by the Human Rights Committee, the 
JA Ashworth, "A Threadbare Principle" [1978] Criminal Law Review 385. 
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European Commission and European Court of Human Rights, the House of Lords 
and Privy Council, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the United States Supreme 
Court. I note that the approaches adopted differ, and that New Zealand courts must 
decide between conflicting approaches. This part of the paper concludes with a 
discussion of the reasons the approach advocated in Part I should be adopted by 
New Zealand courts when determining the meaning and application of section 25( c) 
of the Bill of Rights. 
Part III of this paper is devoted to an examination of the different methods by which 
a burden of proof is placed on an accused, namely: 
(a) when a statute expressly provides that the accused must prove a particular 
matter; 
(b) when a "blanket" reversal of onus clause operates to reverse the onus of 
proving a particular matter; 
( c) when a rule of common law reverses the onus of proof; and 
( d) when an offence is categorised as a strict liability offence. 
It will be argued that whenever a statute expressly reverses a legal burden of proof, 
the limit which this places on the right to be presumed innocent must be justifiable 
under section 5 of the Bill of Rights. It is contended that in many cases the limit 
will not be justifiable, and accordingly the Bill of Rights will be breached. Despite 
this, the New Zealand Courts must continue to apply such a statute, given that 
section 4 of the Bill of Rights does not permit a statute to be impliedly repealed by 
reason only that it conflicts with the Bill of Rights. It is suggested that the Courts 
should declare such provisions to be in breach of the Bill of Rights. 
In relation to "blanket" reversal of onus provisions, section 67(8) of the Summary 
Proceedings Act is examined. It is concluded that this provision offends the right 
to be presumed innocent, and that this is not a justified limit pursuant to section 5. 
Accordingly it is urged that the provision be repealed. 
In relation to common law reversals of onus, the decision in R v Hunf is discussed. 
In that case the House of Lords held that the burden of proving an exception, 
5 [1987] 1 AC 352. 
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exemption, proviso, excuse or qualification, in relation to an indictable offence, is 
on the accused. It is contended that this English common law rule cannot be 
adopted in New Zealand in view of section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights. 
In the final section under Part III the rationale of strict liability "public welfare" 
offences is examined. It will be submitted that the common law category of "strict 
liability" offences must be amended so that the burden placed on the accused is an 
evidential burden only in relation to all offences which carry a "penal" sanction. 
Such an amendment to this category of offence would not result in the "half way 
house" being abolished; the only alteration being to the burden of proof relating to 
the defence of total absence of fault. It will be contended that such an amendment 
is the only way in which the common law relating to strict liability offences can 
comply with the Bill of Rights provision that an accused is entitled to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty. 
In M v Police6 the Court of Appeal opined that section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights 
was merely a statutory enactment of the common law position. This paper will show 
that the right is far more than that. Because the right is now laid down in a statute, 
it must take precedence over common law rules. The provision is capable of being 
used as a powerful weapon by those who are disturbed by the increasing trend of 
removing the burden of proof from the Crown, and placing a burden of proving 
innocence on the accused. 
I. RECOMMENDED APPROACH TO THE RIGHT TO THE 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
Introduction to Part I 
The right to the presumption of innocence in the Bill of Rights can potentially affect 
many aspects of the way suspects are treated in the judicial process.7 This paper 
is concerned with only one aspect: namely, what types of burden placed on an 
6 (Unreported) CA 104/93, 24/3/93. 
7 
For example, the right to bail and issues of name suppression. 
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accused, at different stages of his or her trial, limit the accused's right to be 
presumed innocent. This is a complex issue and numerous different answers have 
been suggested by courts and academics. The approach adopted in this paper is to 
begin by asking what the right must mean; and then to look at the effect of placing 
different burdens on an accused at different stages of his or her trial in light of the 
right to see whether the those burdens limit the right. This analysis is undertaken 
in Part A, and leads to certain conclusions as to when the right will be infringed. 
However the complexity of the issue does not end once we have determined when 
the right is infringed - it is necessary to go further to determine when the right 
applies and when, and if, it is permissible to place limits on the right. This issue is 
addressed in Part B. 
One preliminary definitional matter must be addressed before entering into 
discussion of the meaning of the right to be presumed innocent; that is the meanings 
accorded in this paper to an "evidential" burden and a "legal" burden. An 
evidential burden places a requirement on a person to put forward some evidence 
relating to an issue, in order to make that issue a "live" issue in the proceedings. 
It does not impose any burden of proving that matter. A legal burden is a 
persuasive burden of proof, and means a person must convince the court or jury of 
the truth of the matter in question to a set standard (generally, the prosecution must 
prove matters to the standard of "beyond reasonable doubt" and the defence to the 
standard of "on the balance of probabilities"). 
A. Meaning of the Right to the Presumption of Innocence 
8 
l. Two possible views as to the extent of the right 
Section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights provides that a person charged with 
an offence has "the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law." This provision is capable of two quite different 
interpretations:8 
See Mahoney R ·The Presumption of Innocence: A New Era", Canadian Bar 
Review, Vol 67, March 1988, 1,18-19. 
5 
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The first view is that the right means an accused must be 
presumed innocent until the prosecution have prima facie proved 
all essential elements of the offence. Once the prosecution have 
achieved this, the right to the presumption of innocence has been 
accorded and is extinguished. On this view, the imposition of a 
requirement that the accused prove his or her innocence at a later 
stage of proceedings (such as a requirement that the accused bears 
the legal burden of proving a defence) does not infringe s25(c). 
(2) The alternative view is that the right to the presumption of 
innocence applies at all stages of proceedings and is not 
extinguished until all evidence has been presented and a verdict 
entered. On this interpretation, once the prosecution have led 
prima facie evidence of all elements of the crime, the presumption 
of innocence goes into limbo. At this stage there arises an 
evidential onus on the accused to raise as a live issue a reasonable 
doubt as to the existence of any element of the crime, or as to the 
availability of a defence. If the accused does this, the presumption 
of innocence is once again triggered and operates to place a 
burden on the prosecution to disprove the defence case beyond 
reasonable doubt. 
2. Prefe"ed view 
It is submitted that the second interpretation set out above is the correct 
view. The wording of section 25(c) requires that the presumption exist 
until the accused is "proved guilty". Proof of guilt does not occur until 
all evidence has been heard and a verdict entered, because an accused 
who is acquitted on the basis of the existence of a defence ( eg self-
defence or duress), is not guilty.9 
T. A. Cromwell ·Proving Guilt: The Presumption of Innocence and the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms• in W H Charles, T A Cromwell & K B Jobson 
Evidence and the Ouuter of Rights and Freedoms (Butterworths, Toronto, 1989) 
125, 186. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
The Right to the Presumption of Innocence 
The latter view gains support from Mr Justice Tarnopolsky, who has 
identified 3 main features of the right to be presumed innocent in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms:10 
(1) the state may not interfere with a person until it has established its 
authority to do so; 
(2) the burden of proof remains on the prosecution throughout the trial; 
(3) the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. 
(Emphasis added) 
In line with these two different possible interpretations of the right, two 
distinct methods for analysing when the right has been breached can be 
identified in case law and academic writings:11 
(1) The right is breached whenever either an evidential or a legal 
burden is transferred to the accused which relates to an essential 
part of the offence. Conversely, transferring either type of burden 
in relation to some "extraneous matter" is unobjectionable.12 
(2) The right is breached whenever a legal burden is placed on the 
accused - be it in relation to a part of the offence, or to a defence. 
Conversely, placing an evidential burden on the accused can never 
breach the right to be presumed innocent. This view has 
influential support - notably, Cross on Evidence and Glanville 
Williams.13 
It is submitted that neither of these modes of analysis provide a 
completely satisfactory answer: only a combination of both can fully 
protect the right to the presumption of innocence. To understand this 
it is necessary to examine what the right must mean. 
Tarnopolsky, "The New Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as Compared 
and Contrasted with the American Bill of Rights", 5 Human Rights Quarterly (1983) 
227,242; as quoted in J B Elkind & A Shaw, A Standard for Justice (Auckland, 
Oxford University Press, 1986) 103. 
TA. Cromwell, above n9, 156-157. 
Above n9, 157. 
Above n9, 156, fn 138 and 139. 
7 
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The General Comment of the Human Rights Committee relating to the 
right to the presumption of innocence under the Covenant makes it clear 
that the right places the burden of proving the accused's guilt on the 
prosecution.14 The simplest method of conceptualising the effect of this 
in practice is to focus on two particular consequences which must 
necessarily flow from the right. 
Lamer J, speaking for the Court in the Canadian Supreme Court decision 
in R v Dubois, identified these two components of the right:15 
Section 11( d) imposes upon the Crown the burden of proving the accused's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt as well as that of making out the case against the 
accused before he or she need respond, either by testifying or calling other 
evidence. (Emphasis added) 
This finding illustrates that the right to be presumed innocent 
encompasses something more than the prosecution bearing the burden 
of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt at the end of the trial; it also 
involves the prosecution proving all elements of the offence before an 
accused need respond. 
It is submitted that this must be correct. The right to be presumed 
innocent must entail the prosecution proving an accused's guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt at the end of the trial. A line of Canadian cases have 
reasoned that if the effect of a provision or rule is that at the end of the 
trial an accused may be convicted despite the existence of a reasonable 
doubt, then the right to be presumed innocent has been offended.16 
However the right must comprise more than this - it must also place a 
duty on the prosecution to prove all essential elements of the charge 
Above nl. 
(1985) 22 CCC (3d) 513, 531. 
R v ff'hyte (1988) 42 CCC (3d) 97; R v Holmes (1988) 41 CCC (3d) 497; R v 
Keegrtro (1988) 43 CCC (3d) 150; R v Schwartz (1988) 45 CCC (3d) 97. 
17 
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before an accused need respond in any way. T.A. Cromwell illustrates 
this point by way of a compelling reductio ad absurdum argument:17 
Suppose that a provision places an evidential burden on each element of an 
offence on the accused and that the prosecutor adduces no evidence. If the 
provision follows the normal pattern in the Criminal Code of providing that X, 
Y and Z are, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to be taken as proved, 
the accused must call evidence to the contrary or face certain conviction. 
Assuming that the accused calls no evidence, the trier must be instructed to 
convict even though the prosecutor has adduced no evidence that any one of the 
essential elements does, in fact, exist. As Martin JA. said in Oakes and repeated 
in the context of the evidential burden in issue in Boyle: 
To require a jury to convict an accused on the basis of a purely arbitrary 
assumption that an essential ingredient which is the essence of the 
offence exists ... must surely reduce the right to the presumption of 
innocence to a mere shadow, and make a cardinal principle of the 
criminal law wholly illusory and fanciful. 
Neither of the two approaches outlined above for determining when the 
right to be presumed innocent is breached, effectively protects both 
facets of the right identified by Lamer J. It is only by analysing each 
stage of a trial (ie the proving of essential elements of the offence by 
the Crown, and the raising of defences); together with each type of 
burden that can be placed on an accused (ie legal and evidential 
burdens), in light of the two components of the right, that a satisfactory 
framework for deciding when the right is breached can be constructed. 
3. Analysis of when the right to the presumption of innocence is limited 
(a) Legal Burdens 
It is submitted that the placement of a legal burden of proof on an 
accused to prove any fact or circumstance always conflicts with the 
right to the presumption of innocence. In the words of Lamer J 
in R v Vaillancourt: 18 
Above n9, 159. 
Any provision creating an offence which allows for the conviction of an 
accused notwithstanding the existence of a reasonable doubt on any 
(1987) 39 CCC (3d) 118, 135. 
9 
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essential element infringes [the right to natural justice and the right to be 
presumed innocent]. 
Whenever a legal burden is placed on an accused, the possibility 
exists for the accused to be convicted despite the existence of a 
reasonable doubt. This would occur when an accused managed to 
raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the matter in 
question, but was unable to prove that matter on the balance of 
probabilities. This result is equally true whether applied to 
elements of the offence or matters of defence. It is submitted that 
the possibility of conviction despite the existence of a reasonable 
doubt as to guilt, clearly conflicts with the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty. 
(b) Evidential burdens 
In relation to the placement of an evidential burden, however, it 
is submitted that this will only breach the right to be presumed 
innocent where the evidential onus is to disprove an essential 
element of the offence, prior to the Crown prima facie proving that 
essential element. I examine below the different situations in 
which an evidential burden can be placed on an accused in light 
of the right to be presumed innocent: 
(i) Evidential burden to raise a defence 
An evidential burden on an accused to raise as a live issue 
facts that indicate the existence of a defence does not 
infringe the right to be presumed innocent. That is because 
placing an evidential burden to do this on an accused neither 
removes from the Crown the burden of proving guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt at the end of the trial; nor impinges on the 
right of the accused to have a case made out against him or 
her before he or she need respond. This result accords with 
t 
> , 
r 
i 
r 
1 
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common sense and with practice in all common law 
countries - a practice which has not been questioned by the 
Human Rights committee in relation to the right to be 
presumed innocent in the Covenant. 
If the accused did not bear the evidential burden of raising 
a defence as a live issue, the prosecution would be forced 
to not only prove all elements of an offence, but also to 
positively disprove every conceivable defence, even though 
there may be no evidence to show any particular defence 
was an issue in the case.19 
(An objection that can be taken to this view is that it leaves 
it open to the legislature to redefine crimes in order to 
place evidential burdens on the accused. For example, 
Parliament could describe the offence of murder as "any 
killing of a person", and provide a defence of "lack of 
intent". The conclusion that an evidential burden on the 
accused to raise a defence does not offend the right to be 
presumed innocent, means the onus on the accused to raise 
as a live issue his or her lack of intent under this 
hypothetical section, could not be challenged under section 
25( c). While the analysis outlined above clearly does lead 
For an alternative view - namely that even an evidential onus on an accused to raise 
a defence breaches the right to the presumption of innocence - see T A Cromwell, 
above n9, 188-189. Cromwell states that •placing evidential burdens upon an 
accused in the context of presumptions requires conviction even in the absence of 
evidence on an essential element. ... any evidential burden on the accused may 
authorise a conviction in the absence of evidence of guilt." [p189]. It is submitted 
that this analysis goes unnecessarily far: it involves defining the right to the 
presumption of innocence as requiring the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable 
doubt each and every element that could lead to an accused being not guilty. This 
is not the case: what is required is that the prosecution prove the guilt of the accused 
beyond reasonable doubt. Although absence of provocation is undoubtedly an 
essential element of the crime of murder, the fact that the prosecution do not prove 
absence of provocation in every murder trial does not mean the prosecution are 
contravening the accused's right to be presumed innocent in the many cases where 
the accused has not raised provocation as an issue. The prosecution have 
(presumably) proved the accused's guilt in those cases beyond reasonable doubt. In 
other words, if the defence have not raised provocation as an issue, it would be 
unreasonable to doubt the accused's guilt on the basis that she might have been 
provoked. 
11 
12 
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to this result, it is submitted that were such a re-definition of 
the crime of murder introduced, the appropriate attack 
would not be under the right to be presumed innocent, but 
under section 27 - the right to natural justice.
20 It is 
notable that the Canadian courts have grappled with this 
issue and concluded that the essential elements of a crime 
are not only those which can be discerned from reading 
Parliament's enactment of the crime - there are also essential 
elements imposed by virtue of the right to natural justice.
21
) 
(ii) Evidential burden to disprove an essential element of the 
offe,u;e after prima fade proof by the prosecution 
The placement of an evidential burden on an accused to 
raise as a live issue the non-existence of some essential .. 
element of the offence after the prosecution have apparently 
proved the existence of that element, does not infringe the 
right to the presumption of innocence, because once the 
prosecution have prima facie proved all elements of the 
offence, the right to the presumption of innocence abates 
(see p? above). As with an evidential burden to raise a 
defence, this burden neither displaces the prosecution's duty 
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt at 
the end of the trial; nor the prosecution's duty to put forward 
a case before an accused need respond. 
(iii) Evidential burden to disprove essential. element of the offe,u;e 
before prima fade proof by the prosecution 
It is submitted that to place an evidential burden on an 
accused to negative some essential part of the offence before 
See R Mahoney, above n8, fn42; T. A. Cromwell, above n9, 186. 
R v Vaillancourt above n18. 
22 
23 
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the prosecution have pnma facie proved that element 
beyond reasonable doubt, is contrary to the right to be 
presumed innocent.22 This emerged clearly in R v 
Downey:23 
[T]here is implicit in the right to be presumed innocent an 
obligation on the Crown to make out a case against the accused 
before he or she need respond, either by testifying or by calling 
other evidence. 
To allow an evidential burden to be placed on an accused 
in this case would be to allow the prosecution to use the 
accused's failure to negative a part of the offence as part of 
the case against him or her. This violates the aspect of the 
presumption of innocence identified by Lamer J above, that 
the Crown bear the burden of "making out the case against 
the accused before he or she need respond."24 
4. Summary of reversals which will infringe the right to presumption of 
innocence wuler the above interpretation 
In summary, all instances in which a legal onus is purported to be placed 
on an accused infringe the right to the presumption of innocence. An 
evidential onus, on the other hand, generally will not infringe the Bill of 
Rights. The only exception to this general rule is where the onus is to 
raise as a live issue the non-existence of an essential element of the 
offence before the prosecution have prima facie proved that element. 
Set out below is a table summarising these conclusions: 
I. Weiser "The Presumption of Innocence in Section 11( d) of the Charter and 
Persuasive and Evidential Burdens" (1989) 31 Criminal Law Quarterly 318, 336. 
(1992) 72 CCC (3d) 1, 9; see also R v Boyle (1983) 35 CR (3d) 34, 55. 
Above nl5. 
13 
14 The Right to the Presumption of Innocence 
Evidential burden Legal burden on 
on accused accused 
Does not limit the Whenever a legal 
Re a defence right to the burden is placed on an 
presumption of accused the right to the 
innocence. presumption of 
innocence is limited; 
After prima fade 
the legal burden could 
lead to conviction 
proof by prosecution: despite the existence of 
Does not limit the a reasonable doubt. 
Re an essential right to the 
element of the presumption of 
offence innocence. 
Before prima fade 
proof by prosecution: 
Does limit the right 
to the presumption 
of innocence. 
B. Application of the Right 
The framework described above provides a logical basis for deciding what the 
right means in practice, and accordingly when it is infringed. However, this is 
not the end of the inquiry. It is plain that the right is one that is subject to 
limitations - whether they be viewed as limits that are implicit in the right 
itself, or limits that are justifiable pursuant to general limitations criteria. 
Accordingly, New Zealand courts must also decide upon a method for deciding 
the issue of the application of the right. 
There are two principal approaches that can be identified to the application 
of the right to be presumed innocent. The first approach is that applied by the 
Human Rights Committee, the European Commission and European Court of 
Human Rights, and also by the American Courts. That is, the right is not one 
which should be subject to limitation on the ground that the limitation in 
question is reasonable and justifiable in a free and democratic society (the 
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usual criteria in general limitations clauses). The right is, however, subject 
to implied limits that are inherent in the nature of the right itself. The 
practical effect of this reasoning, is that there are situations where a reversal 
of onus will be permissible, because the right to be presumed innocent does 
not apply in the particular circumstances. 
The second approach is that which has been developed in the Canadian 
Courts. Namely, the right always applies and it will be breached in the 
situations outlined in Part A above. However, it is permissible to limit the 
right on the grounds set out in general limitations provisions, such as 
Section 1 of the Canadian Charter, or Section 5 of the Bill of Rights. Section 
5 of the Bill of Rights provides: 
Justified limitations - Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms 
contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
Accordingly, depending upon the approach adopted to the application of the 
right, the issue when a reverse onus clause appears to violate the right to be 
presumed innocent will be either: "does the right to the presumption of 
innocence apply to this reverse onus clause?"; or "is the limit this reverse 
onus clause places on the right to the presumption of innocence a justifiable 
limit?". 
For the reasons set out in paragraph G of Part II below, it is submitted that 
New Zealand Courts should adopt the latter approach. 
C. Distinctions that are irrelevant when applying the right to the presumption of 
innocence 
Before moving on to discuss the approaches adopted in other jurisdictions to 
the right to the presumption of innocence, it is necessary to lay a foundation 
for the discussion by analysing some of the distinctions which have been 
noted in case law and academic writings. It is submitted that these 
distinctions are not only unhelpful, but they do not bear scrutiny when 
15 
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a "rights centred approach"25 1s adopted in relation to the right to the 
presumption of innocence. 
1. "presumption,.j"reversal. of onus,. distinction 
25 
26 
A "reverse onus provision" explicitly reverses the burden of proving a 
particular matter. A common formula employed in reverse onus clauses 
is "proof of which shall be upon him." When the legal burden of 
proving a particular matter is explicitly placed upon an accused, the right 
to be presumed innocent is limited. Many "presumptions" have precisely 
the same effect, but the analysis of presumptions is more complicated. 
Statutory presumptions are provisions which employ phrases such as "X 
shall be presumed unless the accused [shows/proves] otherwise." In 
analysing the effect of presumptions on the right to be presumed 
innocent, it is necessary to divide presumptions into two basic types: 
(a) those where the presumption involves presuming one fact exists 
( the "presumed fact"), upon proof of another fact ( the "basic 
fact"). An example of this would be: "Where a person is in the 
driver's seat of a vehicle it shall be presumed that he or she has 
care and control of that vehicle."; 
(b) those where the presumption is not based on proof of any basic 
fact. An example of this would be the presumption of sanity. 
The latter type of presumption - those which do not rely on a basic fact -
simply operate to reverse the burden of proof in relation to the matter 
in question. They are no different at all from a reversal of onus 
provision. 26 
R v Goodwin [1993] 2 NZLR 153, 193-194. 
Above n9, 130. 
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The former type of presumption - those which state proof of one fact 
is equivalent to proof of another - must be further subdivided into two 
categories for the purposes of discussing the right to be presumed 
innocent: 
(a) The first category comprises those presumptions where the basic 
fact does prove the presumed fact beyond reasonable doubt 
("basic fact proves presumed fact provisions"). While it may 
appear completely unnecessary for this sort of presumption to be 
enacted, 27 they do exist. 28 In this situation, where the 
presumption requires the accused to merely submit evidence to 
contradict the presumed fact, no issue of the presumption of 
innocence arises, because quite apart from the statutory 
presumption the accused would be required to put forward 
evidence tending to disprove the presumed fact. However, where 
this type of presumption requires the accused to "prove" 
otherwise, a legal burden is transferred to the accused which does 
have the effect of limiting the right to the presumption of 
innocence. 
(b) The second category comprises those presumptions based on basic 
facts, where the basic fact does not lead inexorably to the 
presumed fact, eg "A person who is habitually in the company of 
a prostitute ... shall be presumed to be knowingly living on the 
earnings of prostitution." This type of presumption operates 
either to reverse the burden of proof, or to place an evidential 
R J Delisle When do Evidential Burdens Vw/ate Section ll(d)? (1992) 13 CR (4th) 
161,164. 
A good example of such a provision arose in the case of R v Crooks (1988) 6 WCB 
(2d) 131. The case involved a provision that in prosecutions for certain offences 
under the Act, production of a return, certificate, statement or answer required 
under the Act "purporting to have been filed or delivered by or on behalf of the 
person charged with the offence" would be, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, proof that such return, certificate, statement or answer was filed or 
delivered by, or on behalf of, that person. This provision clearly states that a 
particular basic fact is prima facie proof of a presumed fact, in circumstances where 
it would be patently unreasonable to assume anything other than the presumed fact, 
upon proof of the basic fact in question. 
17 
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burden on an accused prior to the Crown having proved the 
essential elements of their case beyond reasonable doubt. Either 
way, there is a limit on a person's right to be presumed 
innocent.29 
The above conclusions in relation to when presumptions do and do not 
limit the right to be presumed innocent can be summarised in chart form 
as follows: 
PRESUMPTIONS 
With basic facts 
I 
Basic fact proves 
presumed fact 
beyond reas. doubt 
I 
Basic fact 
does not prove 
presumed fact 
beyond reas. 
I doubt 
Without 
basic facts 
Evidential Legal Burden 
on accused to 
I disprove 
Analogous to a 
reverse onus 
provision -
equally limits 
the right to the 
presumption of 
innocence. 
onus on accused 
to disprove 
29 
I 
No breach of 
presumption 
of innocence 
It will be seen from the above that, with the exception of "basic fact 
proves presumed fact" provisions placing an evidential burden on an 
accused, "presumptions" operate in exactly the same way as "reverse 
onus provisions". Having noted that no presumption of innocence 
issue arises with "basic fact proves presumed fact" provisions placing 
an evidential onus on an accused, from this point on it is proposed to 
See R v Whyte above n16 - a provision substituting proof of a particular matter for 
proof of an element of the offence will offend the presumption of innocence unless 
·the existence of the substituted fact leads inexorably to the conclusion that the 
essential element exists, with no other reasonable possibilities." 
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ignore this category of presumption for the purposes of this paper. 
Accordingly, it will be assumed that there is no difference between a 
statutory presumption and a reverse onus clause and I will use the terms 
interchangeably in this paper.30 
Despite the fact that presumptions and reverse onus clauses operate 
identically, Canadian Courts have on occasion distinguished between 
presumptions and reversal of onus provisions. In the Ontario Court of 
Appeal decision in R v Lees Poultry31 it was suggested that the Court 
of Appeal32 decision in R v Oakes was not applicable to the reversal 
of onus section before the Court, because while R v Oakes involved a 
"statutory presumption", sections reversing an onus merely "express in 
statutory form an exception to the general rule of pleading and 
proof."33 It is submitted that the distinction between a "statutory 
presumption" and a "statutory exception to a general rule of proof" is 
specious. Any statutory exception could be rephrased as a presumption, 
and vice versa. To recognise such a distinction for the purposes of 
applying the right to be presumed innocent is to make the application 
of a fundamental human right dependent on techniques of drafting, and 
is unacceptable. 
Some commentators use the terms "mandatory presumption" and "reverse 
onus clause" to differentiate between a clause which places an evidential 
burden on an accused, and a clause which places a legal burden on an accused, 
respectively. I do not use the terms in this sense in this paper. (Indeed, it is 
suggested that this usage can cause confusion, given that in numerous offences 
the phrase • .. . shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved" is utilised. 
Using these terms to differentiate between a legal and evidential onus would 
mean such wording created a "reverse onus" provision, although the word 
"presumed" was used, which could be confusing.) 
(1985) 17 CCC (3d) 539. 
The leading Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v Oakes (26 DLR ( 4th) 200) 
came out following the decision in Lees Poultry, but nevertheless the remarks in the 
latter case distinguishing Oakes would not be affected by the later Supreme Court 
decision in Oakes, which upheld the Court of Appeal decision. 
Above n31, 543. 
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"Permissive" /mandatory" distinction 
US courts have laid down different tests for validating "permissive" 
presumptions and "mandatory" presumptions. While a mandatory 
presumption directs a court to treat one fact as proved upon proof of 
another and in the absence of evidence/proof to the contrary; a 
permissive presumption merely allows the Court to accept the presumed 
fact as having been proved. US Courts have held that mandatory 
reversals of a legal burden of proof always violate the right to due 
process;34 but mandatory reversals of an evidential burden only, and all 
permissive reversals of onus do not violate due process, provided that 
where a presumption relies on a basic fact there is a rational connection 
between the basic fact and the presumed fact. Some Canadian Courts 
have also recognised this distinction as being relevant for the purposes of 
the right to be presumed innocent.35 It is submitted there should be no 
distinction between mandatory and permissive presumptions for the 
purposes of the right to the presumption of innocence. Richard Mahoney 
compellingly points out the fallacy in recognising such a distinction:
36 
... the potential (with permissive presumptions] for a breach of the presumption 
of innocence is similar to that presented by a mandatory presumption. Just 
because the trier of fact need not infer the existence of the presumed fact which 
is one of the essential elements of the crime, does not lessen the breach of the 
presumption of innocence every time such a permissible conclusion is, in fact, 
reached. 
3. "offence"/defence" distinction 
34 
35 
36 
Finally, a distinction is often made between reversals of onus which relate 
to an essential part of the offence; and those which relate to a defence. 
In particular, this is the basis upon which English courts analyse cases 
involving presumption of innocence issues. While it has been noted 
Francis v FrunJclin 85 L.Ed (2d) 344. 
See R v Pye (1984) 11 CCC (3d) 64. 
Above n8, 36. 
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been noted above that the distinction between an essential part of the 
offence and a defence is decisive as to whether the placement of an 
evidential onus infringes the right to the presumption of innocence; it 
is submitted that this distinction is irrelevant for the purposes of 
applying the presumption of innocence to any transference of a legal 
burden of proof. It is notable that the distinction is seen by many critics 
as one of "mere form".37 In the words of G Orchard:38 
... [T]here is no difference in substance or meaning between a prohibition defined 
as extending to certain conduct only and a prohibition defined in wider terms but 
made subject to qualifications which exempt everything except the conduct 
described in the fust place. For example, legislation proscribing assault might be 
so drafted that the actus reus consists of the threat or application of "unlawful" 
force to another, or the actus reus might be described as the threat or application 
of force to another, an exception then being provided for cases where there is 
consent or some other "lawful excuse". 
In the Canadian Supreme Court decision in R v Whyte, 39 Dickson OC, 
giving the unanimous judgment of the Court, stated:40 
The real concern is not whether the accused must disprove an element or prove 
an excuse, but that an accused may be convicted while a reasonable doubt exists. 
When that possibility exists, there is a breach of the presumption of innocence. 
Similarly, in R v Keegstra41 it was held that in determining the 
application of the right to be presumed innocent, no distinction should 
be made between what Parliament has included as an element of the 
offence, and what is termed a defence. 
As noted on page ? above, section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights requires 
the presumption of innocence to apply until the accused is "proved 
G Orchard, above n3, 624. See also G Williams, "Offences and Defences" (1982) 
2 LS 233; Jeffries & Stephan "Defences, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in the 
Criminal Law' (1979) 88 Yale U 1325, 1331-1332; TA. Cromwell, above n9, 175. 
Above n3, 624. 
Above n16. 
Above n16, 109. 
Above n16. 
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guilty". Until the prosecution have proved, beyond reasonable doubt, 
that no defence exists, an accused has not been "proved guilty". 
Accordingly, it is submitted that the analysis in R v Whyte in this regard 
must be correct and any reversal of a legal burden of proof, whether it 
be in relation to a part of the offence, or to a defence, limits 
section 25(c). 
Conclusion - summary of premises on which this paper is based 
It emerges from the above discussion that the following premises underlie this 
paper: 
(1) the right to be presumed innocent applies throughout the trial; 
(2) the right has two facets: it means the Crown bear the burden of proof, 
throughout the trial, to the standard of "beyond reasonable doubt"; and 
the Crown must make out a case against an accused before the accused 
need respond. 
(3) in general, the application of the right cannot be dependent on such 
factors as: 
(i) whether a provIS1on 1s expressed as a "reverse onus" or a 
"presumption"; 
(ii) whether a presumption is permissive or mandatory; or 
(iii) whether a presumption relates to part of the offence in question, 
or to a defence ( at least insofar as legal burdens are concerned). 
( 4) the issue of whether or not the burden transferred by a reverse onus 
clause is a legal or evidential burden, is a crucial one which will often be 
determinative of whether or not the provision breaches the right to the 
presumption of innocence. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF APPROACHES ADOPTED IN OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS 
A. Approach Adopted by the Human Rights Committee under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
42 
l. Article 14(2) of the Covenant 
Article 14(2) of the Covenant provides: 
Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law. 
Article 14 encompasses rights relating to a fair trial. It is notable that 
the travaux preparatoires relating to the right to the presumption of 
innocence indicate that it was felt that this right was so important that 
it should be placed in a separate paragraph within Article 14.42 
The views of the Human Rights Committee as to the meaning of this 
right can be determined from a variety of sources. The first, and most 
important, is the General Comments of the Human Rights Committee. 
Also highly relevant are the decisions of the Human Rights Committee 
on cases brought before it under the Covenant, and the Committee's 
discussions of state reports under the Covenant. I examine each of 
these sources below to determine the Human Rights Committee's 
interpretation of the right to the presumption of innocence. 
2. The General Comments of the Human Rights Committee 
The General Comments set out the Committee's interpretation of the 
articles of the Covenant, and are intended as a guide to State Parties in 
the preparation of their periodic reports under the Covenant. In 
Third Committee, 14th Session, A/4299, 56. 
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relation to the right to be presumed innocent, the General Comments 
provide:43 
The Committee has noted a lack of information regarding article 14, paragraph 
2 and, in some cases, has even observed that the presumption of innocence, which 
is fundamental to the protection of human rights, is expressed in very ambiguous 
terms or entails conditions which render it ineffective. By reason of the 
presumption of innocence, the burden of proof of the charge is on the 
prosecution and the accused has the benefit of doubt. No guilt can be presumed 
until the charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Further, the 
presumption of innocence implies a right to be treated in accordance with this 
principle. It is, therefore, a duty for all public authorities to refrain from 
prejudging the outcome of a trial. 
3. Cases under Article 14(2) of the Covenant 
43 
44 
There is only one case that has come before the Human Rights 
Committee under Article 14(2) of the Covenant which relates to a 
reversal of onus provision. In Yves Morael v France44 the author 
complained that an article of the then French bankruptcy law placed a 
presumption of fault on the defend ant and that this breached his right to 
be presumed innocent. The article in question provided that when 
judicial supervision of the affairs of a company revealed it had 
insufficient assets to pay its creditors, the court could order that all or 
part of the company's debts should be borne by the managers of the 
company. The specific portion of the provision complained of read: 
To be absolved of their liability, such persons must show that they devoted all due 
energy and diligence to the management of the company's affairs. 
The State Party in the case objected to the complaint under Article 14(2) 
on the basis that the provision was not a "criminal offence" and 
therefore the right to be presumed innocent was not triggered. Two 
arguments were advanced to support this: first, because the provision 
could not be invoked by the public prosecutor, but only by the receiver 
( or the Court ex officio), therefore actions under the provision were 
Above nl. 
Comm No 207 /1986, A/44/40, 210. 
45 
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m the nature of civil proceedings, not criminal. Secondly, because 
liability under the provision could never exceed the amount of the loss 
incurred by the company, the liability imposed was not of a penal 
nature. The Human Rights Committee accepted the State Party's 
arguments in this regard, and concluded that there was no violation of 
Article 14(2) because the provision which included a presumption of 
fault was not a "criminal offence". 
4. Discussions of the Human Rights Committee in relation to State Parties' 
Periodical Reports 
The Human Rights Committee have on numerous occasions sought 
further information about the circumstances when states reverse the 
onus of proof;45 although the practice has not always received the 
Committee's condemnation following the State's explanation. 
In 1986 Messrs Elkind and Shaw summarised the position of the Human 
Rights Committee in relation to reversal of onus provisions as 
follows: 46 
[I]t is quite clear, in terms of the Covenant, that it is not permissible to rely on 
any general limitations as a basis for supporting restrictions on the presumption 
of innocence. ... This does not mean that all "reverse onus• provisions or 
"mandatory presumption" provisions are contrary to the Covenant. Resolution 
of such questions must take account of the "delicate" balance inherent in Article 
14(2) itself. It is not, however, permissible to resolve such questions in terms of 
a limitations clause, general or otherwise. In this regard it is important to recall 
the opinion of Mr Tomuschat which was expressed in relation to provisions in the 
Constitution of Sri Lanka. Mr Tomuschat said: 
under the Constitution the presumption of innocence was subject to two 
restrictions. The first was that the burden of proving certain facts could 
be placed upon the accused person. The precise interpretation of the 
presumption of innocence rule was, of course, a delicate matter; in many 
countries, the accused had to prove specific facts in, for example, 
defamation proceedings. Nevertheless, the rule set forth in article 14(2) 
of the Covenant was an absolute one and not subject to any limitation. 
For example, CCPR/C/SR.808 4-9 (Australia); CCPR/C/SR.816 (Belgium); 
CCPR/C/SR.905, 12 (Mauritius); CCPR/C/SR.1049, 3-4 (UK). 
Above nlO, 105-106. 
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The fact that the Committee does not always express disapproval of 
reverse onus provisions may be taken as supporting the inference that the 
right does not apply to all criminal offences. It also seems clear, 
however, that when it does apply the Committee expect an offending 
provision to be amended. In 1989 the Human Rights Committee 
questioned the representatives of the State of Mauritius in relation to 
section 4(1) of their Official Secrets Act (relating to publication of 
cabinet documents) because it appeared to lay the burden of proof of 
innocence on an accused.47 Mr Ramsewak of Mauritius explained that 
the Act " ... sought not to upset the established rule concerning the 
burden of proof, but merely to provide that if a document had been 
published with lawful authorization, that fact should be established by the 
publisher."48 He noted it was not publication, per se, that was the 
offence, but attribution of the document to cabinet. He expressed the 
opinion that:49 
Requiring the publisher to furnish proof of authorization, similar to asking a 
driver to produce his licence, was a requirement which did not contravene the 
presumption of innocence. 
Mr Fodor of the Human Rights Committee in his concluding remarks on 
the Mauritian report stated that the explanation provided in connection 
with section 4 of the Official Secrets Act was not convincing:50 
... if a person charged with an offence under that Act was responsible for proving 
his innocence, then that was not compatible with article 14 of the Covenant, and 
that provision must be amended. 
CCPR/ C /SR.904-906. 
CCPR/C/SR.905, 12-13. 
Above n48, 13. 
CCPR/C/SR.906, 13. 
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5. Summary 
It appears that the approach of the Human Rights Committee to Article 
14(2) of the Covenant is that where a provision to which the article 
applies requires a person to prove his or her innocence, there is a 
breach of the right to be presumed innocent. Such a breach cannot be 
justified and the offending provision should be amended. However, it 
also seems that Article 14(2) will not always apply to a reversal of onus 
provision: in particular, it appears acceptable to reverse the onus of 
proof in defamation proceedings. What is not clear from any of the 
proceedings of the Human Rights Committee, is the criteria upon which 
it should be decided whether or not the right to be presumed innocent 
applies to a particular reverse onus provision. 
B. Approach Adopted by the European Commission and European Court under the 
European Corwention on Human Rights. 
51 
l. Article 6(2) of the European Corwention 
Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: 
Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law. 
2. Cases before the European Commission and the European Court of 
Human Rights 
Three cases have addressed the issue of reverse onus provisions under 
the European Convention, each case upholding the particular reverse 
onus clause in question. 
In Xv United Kingdom51 the applicant complained that his right to be 
presumed innocent had been violated when he was convicted of living 
Application No 5124/71, 42 Collected Decisions, 135. 
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on the immoral earnings of a prostitute pursuant to a provision which 
read: 
[A] man who lives with or is habitually in the company of a prostitute ... shall be 
presumed to be knowingly living on the earnings of prostitution unless he proves 
the contrary. 
The Commission held that the proVIs10n created a "rebuttable 
presumption of fact which the defendant may in turn disprove". They 
went on to conclude that "[t]he provision in question is not, therefore, as 
such, a presumption of guilt." 
The Commission did note, however, that proVIs10ns like the one in 
question could have the same effect as a presumption of guilt if they 
were widely or unreasonably worded. Accordingly, they stated that it is 
not sufficient to examine only the form of drafting of a statutory 
presumption to determine whether it infringes the right to the 
presumption of innocence, but the substance and effect of the 
presumption. They concluded that in the instant case the presumption 
was "neither irrebutable nor unreasonable." 
In Salabiaku v France52 Mr Salabiaku alleged that in the course of his 
conviction for the offence of smuggling, his right to be presumed innocent 
had been violated. Article 392(1) of the French Customs Code provided 
that a person "in possession of contraband goods shall be deemed liable 
for the offence." A rule had evolved in the Courts that "force majeure" 
may be pleaded by an accused in exculpation, despite the strict wording 
of Article 392. The European Court of Human Rights held that 
Mr Salabiaku's right to be presumed innocent had not been infringed by 
the Courts which found him guilty, because no evidence had been led in 
the case which was capable of showing he was a victim of force majeure. 
(1988) 13 EHRR 379. 
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The Court held:53 
Presumptions of fact or law exist in many legal systems and are not contrary to 
the Convention in principle. However, Contracting States are under an obligation 
to remain within reasonable limits which take into account the importance of 
what is at stake and which respect the rights of the defence. 
Given the importance stressed in Part I above of the type of burden 
that is placed on an accused when issues of the presumption of 
innocence are raised, it is notable that the decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Salabiaku did not turn on who would have 
born the burden of proving force majeure, and no distinction appears 
to have been recognised in the case between an evidential burden and 
a burden of proof, given that on the facts not even an evidential burden 
was discharged. This lack of distinction can be seen firstly in the quotes 
from the domestic court decisions. In the Court of Appeal it was said 
that:54 
... any person in possession ( detention) of goods which he or she bought into 
France without declaring them to customs is presumed to be legally liable unless 
he or she can prove a specific event of force majeure exculpating him. ( emphasis 
added) 
In the Court of Cassation (the second domestic level of appeal) it was 
said that:55 
the Court of Appeal ... found that the accused was in possession of the trunk and 
inferred from the fact of possession a presumption which was not subsequently 
rebutted by evidence of an event responsibility for which could not be attributed 
to the perpetrator of the offence or which he would have been unable to avoid. 
(emphasis added) 
The former quote indicates a burden of proof on the accused, while the 
latter appears to be in terms of an evidential onus only. The European 
Court also appeared to overlook the vital distinction between an 
Above n52, 388. 
Above n52, 382. 
Above n52, 383. 
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evidential onus and a burden of proof. In discussing the relevant rule 
that had evolved in the French courts it stated:56 
More recently, it was held that "the specific character of [customs] offences does 
not deprive ... the offender of every possibility of defence since ... the person in 
possession may exculpate himself by establishing a case of force majeure" ... 
(emphasis added) 
They went on to say:57 
As the Government argued at the hearing on 20 June 1988, the French Courts 
thus do enjoy a genuine freedom of assessment in this area and "the accused 
may ... be accorded the benefit of the doubt, even where the offence is one of 
strict liability". ( emphasis added) 
The former quote intimates there is a legal burden of proof on the 
accused, while the reference to "the benefit of the doubt" implies there 
is an evidential onus only. The Court noted that it was not called upon 
to consider "in abstracto" whether Article 392(1) of the Customs Code 
conformed to the Convention, but rather whether it was applied to the 
applicant in a manner which conformed with the right to be presumed 
innocent. As noted above, the Court concluded that it was, because there 
was no evidence of force majeure led in the case. 
In Hoang v France58 the European Commission of Human Rights came 
to a similar decision, based on the decision in Salabiaku. Again the 
Commission refused to consider the express wording of the provisions in 
issue, and concluded that there had been no application of a reverse onus 
provision in a manner which was incompatible with the right to the 
presumption of innocence, because the accused could have raised the 
defence of force majeure. As in Salabiaku the precise allocation of the 
burden of proving that matter, were it raised, was not discussed in the 
case. 
Above n52, 389. 
Above n52, 389. 
(1992) 16 EHRR 53. 
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The result of these cases is that under the European Convention as long 
as a presumption is both "reasonable" and rebuttable, the right to the 
presumption of innocence will not be infringed. 
C. Approach Adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada 
59 
l. Section 11 (d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
Section 11( d) of the Canadian Charter provides: 
Any person charged with an offence has the right ... ( d) to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty according to Jaw in a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal. 
2. Case Law wuler Section ll(d) 
The Canadian Courts have taken a fundamentally different approach to 
addressing the issue of whether or not a statutory presumption violates 
the right to be presumed innocent. Unlike the European jurisprudence, 
the Canadians have interpreted the provision widely, so that virtually all 
provisions which reverse an onus are held to infringe the right to be 
presumed innocent. However, the Charter cases indicate that it is 
permissible to limit the right to be presumed innocent under the general 
limitations clause in the Charter (Section 1). Accordingly, the question 
the Canadian Courts ask in relation to statutory presumptions is 
whether or not a limit on the right to be presumed innocent is, on the 
particular facts, a "reasonable limit, prescribed by law" which is 
"justifiable in a free and democratic society." 
The leading Canadian case in this regard is the Supreme Court of 
Canada decision in R v Oakes59. In that case the accused was charged 
with possession of narcotics for the purposes of trafficking. Section 8 
of the Narcotic Control Act provided that once possession by the 
Above n32. 
31 
32 
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accused of a narcotic was proved, the accused must establish that the 
possession was not for the purposes of trafficking. It was found that 
section 8 placed on the accused a legal burden of negativing a mandatory 
presumption that possession of narcotics was for the purposes of 
trafficking. Dickson OC held that this clearly infringed section 11( d) of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He went on to consider 
whether that infringement was a "reasonable limit, prescribed by law" 
which could be "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" 
for the purposes of justification under section 1 of the Charter. In order 
to decide this question, Dickson OC laid down the test to be applied, as 
follows: 60 
To establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society, two central criteria must be satisfied. First, the objective, 
which the measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right or freedom are 
designed to serve, must be •of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a 
constitutionally protected right or freedom• ... The standard must be high in 
order to ensure that objectives which are trivial or discordant with the principles 
integral to a free and democratic society do not gain sl protection. It is 
necessary, at a minimum, that an objective relate to concerns which are pressing 
and substantial in a free and democratic society before it can be characterized as 
sufficiently important. 
Secondly, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognized, then the party 
invoking sl must show that the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably 
justified. This involves •a form of proportionality test• ... There are, in my 
view, three important components of a proportionality test. First, the measures 
adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They 
must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they 
must be rationally connected to the objective. Secondly, the means, even if 
rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair •as little 
as possible• the right or freedom in question. ... Thirdly, there must be a 
proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for 
limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified 
as of "sufficient importance". 
Applying that test to the case before him, Dickson OC concluded that 
the first limb - sufficiently important objectives - was met, the limit being 
designed to curb drug trafficking. However he went on to hold that the 
second limb - proportionality - was not met. He said:61 
Above n32, 227. 
Above n32, 229. 
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... [T)he proportionality test should begin with a consideration of the rationality 
of the provision: is the reverse onus clause in section 8 rationally related to the 
objective of curbing drug trafficking. At a minimum, this requires that section 
8 be internally rational; there must be a rational connection between the basic 
fact of possession and the presumed fact of possession for the purposes of 
trafficking. . .. In my view, section 8 does not survive this rational connection test. 
... [P)ossession of a small or negligible quantity of narcotics, does not support the 
inference of trafficking. 
Because the Canadian Charter is supreme law, it is possible for the 
Courts to strike down legislation which unjustifiably infringes Charter 
rights. Accordingly it was held that section 8 of the Narcotics Control 
Act was of no force and effect. 
3. Contrasting Canadian and Europecm Approaches 
The case of R v Downey62 illustrates the difference in approach 
between the European Commission and the Canadian Courts well. The 
provision in question in that case was virtually identical to the provision 
challenged in Xv United Ki.ngdom63. The charge was of living wholly 
or partly on the avails of prostitution of another person. Section 212(3) 
of the Canadian Criminal Code provided that proof that a person lived 
with or was habitually in the company of prostitutes was, in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary, proof that the person lived on the avails of 
prostitution. Unlike the European Commission, the Canadian Supreme 
Court judges were unanimous that this presumption infringed the right 
to be presumed innocent in sll(d) of the Charter. They were divided, 
four to three, however, as to whether that limit was justifiable under s l. 
The majority held that the section satisfied the Oakes test and therefore 
the provision was held to be constitutional. 
Similarly, it has been noted above that there are indications that the 
view of the Human Rights Committee is that the imposition of the 
burden of proving the defence of truth in defamation cases is not a 
reversal of onus to which the presumption of innocence would apply; 
Above n23. 
Above n51. 
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yet the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Keegstra64 clearly held that the 
placement of the burden of proving the defence of truth on an accused 
in relation to a charge of wilfully promoting hatred against an identifiable 
group, breached section 11( d) of the Charter. As in the Downey case, the 
majority went on to hold that the breach was a justifiable limit pursuant 
to section 1, because the criteria set out in Oakes were met. 
D. The Approach Adopted by the House of Lords/Privy Council C-the English 
approach") 
The right to be presumed innocent is a common law right in England. As a 
result of the decision in R v Hunt65 the position is that the right applies to 
essential elements of the offence only, and not to matters of excuse or 
justification. Where essential elements are concerned, the right may be 
overridden by Parliament, either expressly or by implication. The Privy 
Council, perhaps unsurprisingly, have recently adopted very similar reasoning 
in determining the approach that should be taken to the right to be presumed 
innocent under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance 1991 ("HKBOR"). 
In Attorney General of Hong Kong v Lee Kwong-ku.t66 it was noted that the 
Canadian "two-step" approach differs from the European approach.67 Lord 
Woolf, delivering the judgment of the court, opined that the existence of the 
express limitation clause in section 1 of the Canadian Charter made it 
understandable that the Canadian courts should have adopted a two stage 
approach to construing the right to be presumed innocent; and that the 
adoption of this two stage approach in tum made it understandable that a 
"strict" approach to contravention of the right should have been adopted.
68 
He went on, however, to reject this approach in favour of what he believed to 
be a less complex test, based on the reasoning of the European Court in 
64 Above n16. 
65 Above n5. 
66 (1993) 3 WLR 329. 
67 Above n66, 343. 
68 Above n66, 342. 
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Salabiaku v Frcmce69 and on the English decisions in R v Edwards70 and R 
v Hunt.71 The test prescribed is:72 
The court can ask itself whether, under the provision in question, the prosecution is 
required to prove the important elements of the offence; while the defendant is 
reasonably given the burden of establishing a proviso or an exemption or the like of the 
type indicated by Lawton U [in R v Edwardr]. If this is the situation article 11(1) is not 
contravened. 
The case involved two separate appeals from decisions of the Hong Kong 
Court of Appeal striking down certain provisions on the basis that they 
contravened the accused's right to be presumed innocent under the HKBOR. 
The first provision was determined as requiring an accused to disprove an 
essential element of the offence and was accordingly held to contravene the 
right to the presumption of innocence in a manner which could not be 
justified by the Crown. 73 
The second provision was construed as one which placed a burden of proof 
on an accused in relation to a matter which did not constitute part of the 
substance of the offence (it being irrelevant whether it be a matter of 
"defence" or "excuse"). In relation to such matters it was stated that "some 
exceptions will be justifiable, others will not."74 The test as to whether or 
not a reversal of onus relating to a matter of defence, excuse or exception is 
justifiable is one of reasonableness. It was held in relation to the second 
provision at issue that: "In the context of the war against drug trafficking, for 
a defendant to bear that onus ... is manifestly reasonable and clearly does not 
offend article 11(1)." 
Above n52. 
[1975] QB 27. 
Above n5. 
Above n66, 344. 
Above n66, 344. 
Above n66, 341. 
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The English approach could be viewed as a more exacting version of the 
European approach. Having adopted the "offence/defence" dichotomy as 
decisive, the result in English courts is that virtually75 all reversals of the onus 
of proof of an essential element of an offence will be seen as unjustifiably 
infringing the right to be presumed innocent; while reversals of the burden of 
proving a matter of defence or excuse will not infringe the right to be 
presumed innocent, so long as the reversal in question is "reasonable". While 
the first part of the English approach adds a significant gloss to the approach 
of the European Court of Human Rights, for the purposes of considering the 
approach New Zealand Courts should adopt I propose to contrast the 
Canadian "two step" approach with the "reasonableness" approach adopted 
by the Human Rights Committee; the European Court and Commission; and 
by the Privy Council, which I shall collectively describe as the "European 
approach". 
E. Approach Adopted by the United States Supreme Court 
1. Source of the right 
75 
76 
While there is no express provision that an accused has the right to be 
presumed innocent in the United States Constitution, the right has clearly 
been accepted as being an important part of the right to "due process" 
accorded in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.76 The analysis of 
presumption of innocence questions does not turn on whether or not a 
particular reversal of an onus of proof is "justifiable" or "reasonable"; 
rather the Supreme Court has attempted to lay down rules as to when a 
provision which reverses an onus is, and is not, constitutional. 
It must be noted that the way has been left open for a court to hold that a reversal 
of the burden of proof in relation to an essential element of the offence does not 
infringe the right to be presumed innocent. In R v Hunt it was noted that such 
occasions are •likely to be exceedingly rare." (above n5, 375); and this statement 
was quoted with approval in Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Lee Kwon1:tlaa 
(above n66, 334). 
Re Winship 25 L Ed 2D 368; Estelle v Wuuams 48 L Ed 2d 126; Taylor v Kentucky 
56 L Ed 2d 468. 
2. 
f 
77 
78 
79 
80 
The Right to the Presumption of Innocence 
Types of reverse onus that will breach the presumption of innocence -
permissive/mandatory distinction 
In relation to the types of reversal of a burden of proof that violate the 
right to the presumption of innocence, the case law takes yet another 
approach to those outlined above. The crucial distinction as far as the 
United States Supreme Court is concerned, is whether or not a 
presumption is "permissive" or "mandatory". Mandatory presumptions 
relating to an element of the offence (whether rebuttable or 
irrebuttable) always violate the right.n On the other hand, rebuttable 
mandatory presumptions going to matters of defence, and all permissive 
presumptions, do not violate the right, so long as there is a "rational 
connection" between the basic and presumed facts.78 A "rational 
connection" for this purpose will exist where it can be said with 
substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to 
flow from the proved fact. 79 
The reasonmg behind holding that perrmss1ve presumptions never 
infringe the right to the presumption of innocence, provided the 
requisite rational connection exists, is explained in Ulster County Court 
V Allen:80 
Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or 
reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the 
application of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard only if, under the facts 
of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection 
permitted by the inference. For only in that situation is there any risk that an 
explanation of the permissible inference to a jury, or its use by a jury, has caused 
the presumptively rational factfinder to make an erroneous factual determination. 
Sandstrom v Montana 61 L Ed 2d 39; Patterson v New Yorlc 53 L Ed (2d) 281; 
Mullaney v Wilbur 44 L Ed (2d) 508; Francis v Franklin, above n34; Carella v 
California 105 L Ed 2d 218. 
Francis v Franklin, above n34; Ulster County Court v Allen 60 L Ed 2d 777. 
Ulster County Court v Allen above n78; Leary v United States 23 L Ed 2d 57; Yates 
v Evatt 114 L Ed 2d 432. 
Above n78, 792. 
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The distinction between permissive and mandatory presumptions has 
been criticised above.81 It will suffice to note here that it is incorrect 
to conclude that because a presumption is permissive no issue of the 
presumption of innocence can arise. In the context of the United States 
jurisprudence a permissive presumption is constitutional if the basic fact 
makes the existence of the presumed fact "more likely than not". This 
is a lower standard than that required under the right to the presumption 
of innocence, namely "beyond reasonable doubt". Thus a jury would be 
allowed to conclude that a person was guilty of an offence on the basis 
of evidence that made his or her guilt "more likely than not" - whenever 
a jury convicts on this basis, the right to the presumption of innocence is 
infringed. The fact that the jury came to their conclusion because of a 
permissive, as opposed to a mandatory presumption, is irrelevant. 
3. Conflicting cases as to the offence/defence dichotomy 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
In relation to the offence/ defence dichotomy relied on so heavily in the 
English courts, the United States case law is contradictory. In Mullaney 
v Wilbw1l2 a rule which had the effect of placing the burden of proving 
the defence of provocation on the accused, was held to violate the 
accused's right to the presumption of innocence. In Patterson v New 
York83 a statutory defence of extreme emotional disturbance ( described 
as "mental infirmity not arising to the level of insanity"84) that was 
provable by the accused, was held not to be unconstitutional. This result 
was said to be authorised by earlier decisions to the effect that placing 
the burden of proving the defence of insanity on an accused does not 
infringe the right to be proved innocent.85 The analogy hinged on the 
Above p20. 
Above n77. 
Above n77. 
Above n77, 290. 
Namely, Leland v Oregon (1952) 96 L Ed 1302 and Rivera v Delaware (1976) 
50 L Ed 2d 160. 
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fact that the defence in question in both these situations was not a 
defence that involved negating any element of the offence. Finally, in 
Martin v Ohio,86 relying heavily on the decision in Patterson, a bare 
majority (5:4) held that it does not violate the right to the presumption 
of innocence to place the burden of proving the defence of self-defence 
on an accused. 
In a strong dissent, Justice Powell (with whom Justices Brennan, 
Marshall and Blackmun concurred) noted the majority's failure to 
discuss or even cite the decision in Mullaney v Wdbur. 87 The dissent 
also noted that, in their view, the majority had misapplied the decision 
in Patterson in using it to uphold the constitutionality of placing the 
burden of proving self-defence on an accused, because self-defence 
often involves a sudden reaction without prior plan or specific purpose 
to take a life, and in these cases it involves denying an essential element 
of the crime, namely intent.88 
Given the conflict in the authorities, and the lack of unanimity on the 
Supreme Court bench, it seems unlikely that the last word has been 
heard on this issue. 
Draft Declaration on the Right to a Fair Trial 
In 1989 the Economic and Social Council Sub-Commission on the Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities requested two of its members 
to prepare a report on international standards in relation to the right to a fair 
trial and to recommend which of the fair trial provisions should be made non-
derogable.89 In their report90 the two members (Mr Stanislav Chernichenko 
90 
(1987) 94 L Ed 2d 267. 
Above n86, 279. 
Above n86, 278. 
Resolution 1989/27. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/34. 
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and Mr William Treat) recommended that a comprehensive study be 
undertaken with a view to preparing a declaration on the right to a fair trial. 
The study was undertaken and on 25 June 1993 Messrs Chernichenko and 
Treat submitted a draft declaration on the right to a fair trial and remedy.
91 
Article 59 of the draft declaration relates to the right to be presumed innocent. 
Article 59( c) relates specifically to statutory presumptions. It provides:
92 
Legal presumptions of fact or law are permissible in a criminal case only if they are 
rebuttable, allowing a defendant to prove his or her innocence. 
This clause would appear to suggest that any reversal of onus is permissible, 
provided it is open to the accused to rebut it by proving his or her innocence. 
From a perusal of the 1991 and 1992 reports of Messrs Chernichenko and 
Treat93 it would appear that this interpretation of the right to the 
presumption of innocence is based on the first two decisions under the 
European Convention on Human Rights discussed above. In Addendum 1 to 
their third report94 they discuss the interpretation of international fair trial 
norms by the European Commission and the European Court of Human 
Rights. They conclude that under the European Convention presumptions of 
fact or law are not prohibited in domestic legislation, but that such 
presumptions must be kept within reasonable limits. They go on to conclude 
that, under European Human Rights jurisprudence "[a] legal system that 
contains rebuttable presumptions of fact ... does not violate the principle of 
presumption of innocence. 1195 
It is notable that the conclusion that a rebuttable presumption does not 
infringe the presumption of innocence does not accord with the European 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
E/CN.2/Sub.2/1993/24/ Add.1. 
Above n91, 17. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/29 and E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/24 respectively. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/ Add.1. 
Above n94, 46. 
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decisions, which contain the additional requirement that the presumption 
must be "reasonable". Neither does it accord with comments of the Human 
Rights Committee under the Covenant, who have criticised rebuttable reverse 
onus provisions for breaching the right to the presumption of innocence. The 
draft declaration, as it stands, would clearly permit, for example, the reversal 
of onus in the Mauritian Official Secrets Act which attracted the reproof of 
one member the Human Rights Committee; and also the reversal in question 
in R v Oakes. Indeed, with no reference to the need for the reversal to even 
be "reasonable", it would validate a provision which stated "Any person 
found within 5 metres of a recently deceased person shall be presumed to be 
guilty of murder unless he or she proves otherwise"! While such a provision 
could undoubtedly be challenged as a breach of natural justice, it should 
clearly not be a technically permissible provision under an international 
declaration on the right to a fair trial. It is to be hoped that clause 59( c) of 
the draft declaration will not be adopted in its present broad form. It clearly 
does not correctly interpret the meaning of Mticle 14(2) of the Covenant, 
and is capable of authorising patently unacceptable breaches of this 
fundamental right. 
Reasons the Approach Advocated in Part I is the Most Appropriate for New 
Zealand Courts to Adopt to the Application of Section 25(c) 
The New Zealand courts will be faced with a choice between two different 
approaches to applying the right to the presumption of innocence. In 
summary, these are: 
41 
(a) The European approach - the right to be presumed innocent is subject 
to implied limits and is not always infringed by a reversal of onus 
provision. Where such a provision does infringe the right, however, 
resort to a general limitations clause is not permissible. The European 
cases have concluded that the right is not triggered by a "reasonable" 
presumption that is rebuttable by the accused. It is not clear on what 
criteria the Human Rights Committee decide whether or not the right 
applies, but it appears to be more narrow criteria than have been 
42 The Right to the Presumption of Innocence 
adopted in the decisions under the European Convention. The Privy 
Council have concluded that reversing the onus of proving an excuse or 
defence will not infringe the right where the reversal is "reasonable". 
(b) The Canadian approach - the Canadians tend to regard virtually all 
statutory presumptions as prima facie infringing the right to the 
presumption of innocence. To be a permissible limit on the right, the 
provision in question must meet the criteria expressly provided in the 
general limitations section (Section 1 of the Charter). 
The Bill of Rights is an act to affirm New Zealand's commitment to the 
Covenant. Accordingly, the approach given to the meaning of the right to be 
presumed innocent must not result in less protection being granted to a citizen 
than would be granted under the Covenant. The approach adopted under the 
Canadian Charter results in the right prima facie applying in more 
circumstances than it would do under the Covenant. The re~ort to the general 
limitations clause by the Canadian Courts appears to serve a similar purpose 
to the consideration of whether or not the right should apply under the 
European approach. It is submitted that the Canadian approach does not 
necessarily result in the right being accorded in fewer situations than it would 
be under the Covenant. In Attorney General of Hong Kong v Lee Kwon-kut the 
Privy Council noted there are two different approaches to interpreting the right 
to be presumed innocent, and concluded that:96 " •.. applying the two-stage 
approach, the courts in Canada in the end tend to come to the same 
conclusion as would be reached in other jurisdictions." Accordingly, it is 
submitted that to adopt the Canadian approach to deciding the application of 
the right is open to New Zealand courts. 
It is submitted that this approach is preferable to the European approach. The 
problem with the European approach is it is nowhere made clear exactly what 
criteria are applied in order to determine whether or not a particular 
presumption triggers the right to be presumed innocent. ( Other than the 
general comment that a presumption must be "reasonable"; and it is notable 
96 Above n66, 343. 
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that even this requirement is not present in the draft Declaration on the 
Right to a Fair Trial). Accordingly, if this approach were to be adopted, it 
would be possible for courts to declare that any presumption simply did not 
trigger the right to the presumption of innocence, without canvassing the 
issues raised by reversing the onus in the particular case. By adopting the 
Canadian approach, the right will almost invariably be held to be breached 
by reverse onus provisions, but some limitations will be held to be justifiable. 
This approach will require the legislature and courts to consider the effects 
of reversing the onus of proof pursuant to specific criteria. 
It is also relevant for the purpose of deciding what approach the New 
Zealand courts should adopt, to note that it was clearly envisaged by the 
legislature that the Canadian jurisprudence would be followed in this country. 
The White Paper on the Bill of Rights quoted extensively from the Court of 
Appeal decision in R v Oakes, and appeared to assume that the test which 
would be adopted in this country to determining whether a reversal of onus 
could be justified would involve the Oakes "rational connection" test.97 
Finally, in Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Lee Kwong-ku/98 the Privy 
Council clearly regarded the fact that the Canadian Charter contains an 
express section specifying permissible limits on rights as being relevant to the 
approach adopted in that country. Such a provision does not exist in the 
Hong Kong Bill of Rights, in relation to which the Privy Council adopted an 
analysis more closely analogous to that of the European courts. The Bill of 
Rights, however, does contain an express limitations clause, and accordingly 
it is appropriate that our courts should draw on the Canadian jurisprudence 
for its approach to the right to be presumed innocent. 
While advocating the adoption of the Canadian approach in this country, a 
cautionary note must be sounded: any consideration by the courts of whether 
or not a particular presumption is a justifiable limitation, must be coloured 
A Bill of Rights for New Zealand -A White Paper (Government Printer, Wellington, 
1985) 95-96. 
Above n66, 342. 
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by the fact that under the Covenant the right to be presumed innocent is 
perceived as "fundamental". This suggests that the decision that a particular 
reversal of onus is justifiable should never be reached lightly. Recent 
Canadian cases indicate a trend away from strict application of the test laid 
down in the Supreme Court decision in R v Oakes; and an alarming number 
of reverse onus provisions are being held to be justifiable limits on the right 
to be presumed innocent. 99 Bearing in mind the fundamental nature of the 
right; and the concern expressed by the Human Rights Committee that many 
states place conditions on the right to be presumed innocent which render it 
ineffective, 100 such watering down of the test should not be permitted to 
occur in this country. Only where a reverse onus is "demonstrably" 
justifiable, should such a limit on the right to the presumption of innocence be 
tolerated by our courts. 
III. SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF REVERSALS OF ONUS 
Introduction to Part II 
A reversal of onus can occur in four distinct situations: 
(1) where a statute specifically provides that the accused will bear the onus of 
proof of a particular matter; 
(2) pursuant to section 67(8) of the Summary Offences Act, which reverses the 
onus of proving an exception, exemption, proviso, excuse or qualification in 
relation to summary offences; 
(3) pursuant to the rule in R v Hunt (should that decision be followed) that an 
accused bears the onus of proving exceptions, exemptions, provisos, excuses 
and qualifications in relation to indictable offences; 
99 
100 
D Stuart, "Wholesale Travel: Presuming Guilt for Regulatory Offences 1s 
Constitutional but Wrong" 8 CR (4th) 225, 228. 
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where the offence is categorised as a "strict liability" offence, and accordingly 
the burden of proving the defence of "total absence of fault" is placed upon 
the accused. 
I discuss each of these in turn below. 
A. Specific Statutory Reversals 
l. Methodology for interpreting specific statutory reversals 
The New Zealand statute books contain numerous examples of specific 
presumptions/reversals of onus.101 Where clauses specifically setting 
out a presumption or reverse an onus can be interpreted as merely 
imposing an evidential onus on the accused, this will not infringe the Bill 
of Rights, unless the presumption relates to an essential element of the 
offence, not previously prima facie proved by the prosecution. Section 
6 of the Bill of Rights Act provides that where an enactment can be 
given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms 
contained in the Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any 
other meaning. Accordingly, where a specific statutory presumption can 
be interpreted as imposing merely an evidential onus on the accused, 
this interpretation must be preferred.102 An evidential onus will 
generally not infringe the Bill of Rights at all; and in the limited cases 
where I have concluded that it does breach the Bill of Rights, the limit 
is less severe than would be the case if a legal onus were imposed on 
the accused. 
101 Examples include sections 229(2) and 233(2) of the Crimes Act 1961; section 6(6) 
of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975. 
102 See Robertson ( ed) Adams on Criminal Law (Brooker & Friend, Wellington, 1992) 
Ch 10.16.08. 
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Such an interpretation will not always be possible, however. A case in 
point is R v Phillips.103 That case concerned section 6( 6) of the Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1975, which provides: 
.. . a person shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to be in possession of 
a controlled drug for a purpose set out in paragraph ... ( e) [sale J ... if he is in 
possession of ... 
( e) ... 28 grams or more of cannabis plant. 
The trial judge in that case instructed the jury that once possession of 
over 28 grams of cannabis was proved ( and this was not contested in the 
case), the onus was on the accused to prove, on the balance of 
probabilities, that he did not have the drug for the purposes of sale. This 
instruction was challenged in the Court of Appeal, by reference to 
sections 6 and 25(c) of the Bill of Rights. It was contended that the 
words "until the contrary is proved" could be interpreted as placing an 
evidential onus only on the accused; and that this interpretation must 
therefore be the preferred interpretation, for consistency with section 
25(c) of the Bill of Rights. However, Cooke P found that such an 
interpretation of the word "proved" was "strained and unnatural" and 
that the Court would not be justified in adopting it, even in light of the 
Bill of Rights. This decision will make it virtually impossible for a 
statutory presumption which employs the words "proof" or "proved" to 
be interpreted as casting an evidential onus only on an accused. 
Formulas which employ less specific wording, however, may be open to 
this interpretation.104 
On the approach advocated in this paper, whenever a legal burden of 
proof is placed on an accused, the right to the presumption of innocence 
is infringed and the question must be asked whether or not that 
[1991] 3 NZLR 175. 
For example, in Adams on Criminal Law, above n102, it is suggested that where 
a statutory presumption employs the word "show" or "shows", it will be open to 
the interpretation that an evidential onus only should be placed on the accused. 
Given that this interpretation is possible, to comply with the Bill of Rights it is the 
interpretation which must be adopted. 
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infringement is justifiable in a free and democratic society. The 
appropriate test to use is that from R v Oakes. 
Recommended Approach where a Court finds there is an Unjustifiable 
Breach 
Under the Bill of Rights, however, courts do not have the power to do 
strike down legislation that is found to unjustifiably limit a right in the 
Bill of Rights. Section 4 provides: 
No court shall, in relation to any enactment ... 
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, 
or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment -
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision in this Bill of 
Rights . 
Where an unambiguous statutory provision specifically reverses the legal 
burden of proof, this clause will operate to save the provision, even if 
the provision does not satisfy the Oakes test as to reasonable limits. 
Accordingly the Courts must uphold the provision, as indeed was done 
in R v Phillips.105 This does not mean that the analysis as to whether 
a provision can be justified under section 5 should not be undertaken 
in these cases, however. 
An option open to a Court to express concern about an infringement of 
the fundamental human right to the presumption of innocence would be 
to make a judicial declaration that the section in question infringes the 
right, and is not a reasonable limit justifiable in the free and democratic 
society. Such an approach has been foreshadowed in the Court of 
Appeal in Temese v Police.106 In that case, after noting that 
Professor F.M. Brookfield has helpfully analysed the relationship 
105 Above, n103. 
106 Unreported, 27 November 1992, Court of Appeal, CA 209/92. 
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between sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 in a recent article, 107 Cooke P went on 
to opine:108 
[Professor Brookfield] suggests inter alia that, although a court may find that an 
enactment is inconsistent with an affirmed right or freedom and therefore 
overrides the right or freedom, the court should also be prepared to hear 
argument on whether the enactment is a limitation justified under s.5. That 
approach may have the drawback that, if the court were to say that the limitation 
was unjustified yet overridden by the enactment, the court could be seen by some 
to be gratuitously criticising Parliament by intruding an advisory opinion. But 
possibly that price ought to be paid. 
It is imperative that the Courts do take such a step if they are to 
effectively protect human rights in New Zealand. In addition to alerting 
Parliament to possible breaches of the Covenant, such a declaration 
would pave the way for a case to be taken to the Human Rights 
Committee under the Optional Protocol. 
B. Blanket reversal. contained in section 67(8), Summary Offences Ad 
l. Approaches to determining the val.idity of section 67(8) reversals 
107 
108 
Section 67(8) of the Summary Offences Act provides: 
Any exception, exemption, proviso, excuse or qualification, whether it does or 
does not accompany the description of the offence in the enactment creating the 
offence, may be proved by the Defendant but ... need not be negatived in the 
information, and whether or not it is so negatived, no proof in relation to the 
matter shall be required by the informant. 
In Canada section 730(2) of the Criminal Code imposes a blanket 
reversal of onus where exceptions and exemptions etc appear in summary 
offences, which is analogous to section 67(8) of the Summary Offences 
Act. Similar provisions exist in provincial legislation. To date such 
provisions have generally been upheld as not violating the right to the 
presumption of innocence under the Charter in the cases where they have 
been applied. 
[1992] New Zealand Recent Law Review, 236. 
Above n106, 4. 
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In R v Lees Poultry109 section 48(3) of the Provincial Offences Act was 
discussed. It provides: 
The burden of proving that an authorisation, exception, exemption or 
qualification, prescribed by law operates in favour of the defendant is on the 
defendant, and the prosecutor is not required, except by way of rebuttal, to prove 
that the authorisation, exception, exemption or qualification does not operate in 
favour of the defendant, whether or not it is set out in the information. 
The defendant in that case was charged under section 3 of the Meat 
Inspection Act, which provides: 
No person shall engage in the business of operating a plant, other than an 
establishment, without a licence therefor from the director. 
The defence presented no evidence either as to the existence of a 
licence, or that the business was an "establishment", and the 
prosecution presented no evidence that the business was not an 
"establishment". The defendant was convicted. On appeal to the 
County Court, the conviction was dismissed on the basis that section 
48(3), as applied to section 3 of the Meat Inspection Act, was 
unconstitutional. It required the defence to prove the existence of a 
licence, which was not a matter rationally connected to the operation of 
the business, therefore the Court of Appeal test from Oakes was not 
met. The Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed. As noted in Part I 
above, this Court distinguished the decision in Oakes, as follows: 110 
Unlike the section in question in R v Oakes, ... s48(3) does not purport to create 
a presumption, but rather to express in statute form an exception to a general 
rule of pleading and proof on specific issues in summary conviction type cases. 
Above n31. 
Above n31, 543. 
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(It has been submitted above that this distinction does not bear 
scrutiny.111) Brooke JA, delivering the judgment of the Court, 
concluded:112 
In my opinion, s48(3) of the Provincial Offences Act ... is a just law and does not 
offend important principles which are now expressed in sll( c) and ( d) of the 
Charter. 
He went on to dismiss the appeal, however, on the basis that a business 
not being an establishment was an essential element of the offence, and 
the failure of the prosecution to prove this meant the defendant was 
entitled to have his conviction overturned. 
It is submitted that the Supreme Court decision in Oakes, which was 
delivered after this case, must be regarded as the leading authority on the 
constitutionality of reverse onus provisions and statutory presumptions, 
and that little weight can be accorded to the obiter comments of Brooke 
JA in Lees Poultry. 
One approach to issues of reversing the onus under section 67(8) is for 
the Courts to examine the justifiability of the reversal imposed by the 
section in each case in which it is relied upon. It is submitted, however, 
that a better approach is to test the justifiability of the section itself for 
the purposes of establishing whether there is a breach of the right to be 
presumed innocent. 
2. A rights centred analysis of section 67(8) 
111 
112 
It is submitted that blanket prov1S1ons such as section 67(8) of the 
Summary Offences Act, violate the right to the presumption of innocence, 
and further that they cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. 
Above p19. 
Above n31. 
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Once it is accepted that the placing of a legal burden on the accused to 
prove or disprove any fact contravenes the presumption of 
innocence,113 it is apparent that section 67(8) (which imposes a 
blanket requirement in relation to summary offences that the accused 
must prove certain types of fact), must contravene section 25(c) of the 
Bill of Rights. Accordingly, the question which must be examined is 
whether that contravention is reasonably justifiable in a free and 
democratic society. It is submitted that the appropriate test to use to 
decide this is that in R v Oakes. 
It is submitted that blanket reversal of onus clauses in general do not 
meet the first limb of the Oakes test. The objective such clauses are 
designed to serve must be to ease the burden on the state of proving 
the guilt of persons accused of summary offences which include 
provisos, exceptions, exemptions etc. Objectives which are "discordant 
with principles integral to a free and de,!Ilocratic society" will not be 
justifiable.114 The objective of s67(8) identified above is surely 
discordant with such integral principles: it is directly contrary to the 
right to the presumption of innocence which has been described as 
"fundamental to the protection of human rights."115 Accordingly it 
is submitted that s67(8) does not meet the first limb of the Oakes test. 
It is further submitted that the second limb of the Oakes test is also not 
met. Under this limb it should be noted that the measures designed to 
achieve an objective, may not be arbitrary or unfair. 116 The section 
67(8) reversal of onus is patently "arbitrary", because it applies to all 
statutory exceptions, exemptions etc in summary offences, irrespective 
of the logic of reversing the onus in the particular case. An example 
will illustrate this point. In Oakes it was said that the "minimum" 
Above, p9. 
Above n32, 227. 
Above nl. 
Above n32, 227. 
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requirement in order to meet the proportionality test is that there must 
be a rational connection between the basic fact (in that case, possession 
of drugs), and the fact which must be presumed unless the accused proves 
the contrary (in that case, possession for the purpose of trafficking). In 
Oakes it was held that there was no such rational connection, because 
mere possession of drugs (the basic fact) bore no rational connection to 
the proposition that a person must be a trafficker of drugs ( the presumed 
fact). In Green v Ministry of Agricultwe & Fisheries117 the accused were 
charged with being found in possession of toheroa taken from below the 
high water mark. The accused relied on a provision in the Fisheries Act 
that "nothing in this Act shall affect any Maori fishing rights", and 
argued that they were exercising Maori fishing rights when they took the 
toheroa. It was held that this was a matter of excuse, which meant that 
section 67(8) reversed the onus of proof, therefore the accused bore the 
onus of proving that they were entitled to possess the toheroa pursuant 
to Maori fishing rights. If this particular instance of the section 67(8) 
reversal of onus is subjected to the rational connection test in Oakes, the 
arbitrariness of section 67(8) becomes clear. One way of applying the 
Oakes test is to rephrase the reversal as a presumption: namely, "anyone 
found in possession of toheroa shall be presumed not to have obtained 
the toheroa pursuant to a Maori fishing right." (This is the practical 
result of the reversal of onus pursuant to s67(8).) It must then be asked 
if the connection between the basic fact and the presumed fact is a 
rational connection. It patently is not. The basic fact (possession of 
toheroa) in no way tends to prove the presumed fact (absence of Maori 
fishing rights). It is arguable that it is not relevant to apply the internal 
rational connection test to reverse onus clauses as opposed to 
presumptions which rely on a basic fact to prove a presumed fact. 
However, it is submitted that even ignoring the lack of internal rationality 
in the reversal that occurred in the Green case, the placement of the 
burden of proof on the accused cannot be justified. While protecting 
toheroa stocks may well be a pressing and substantial concern in a free 
[1990] 1 NZLR 411. 
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and democratic society; it is clearly arguable that honouring Treaty of 
Waitangi obligations and according Maori fishing rights is an equally, 
if not more, pressing and substantial concern. In addition, proving the 
existence of Maori fishing rights is not something that will be easy to 
prove for an accused, and accordingly the effect of the reversal is not 
proportional to the objective. This undoubtedly is a reversal of the onus 
of proof which unjustifiably infringes the fundamental right to the 
presumption of innocence. It illustrates that section 67(8) results in 
arbitrary reversals of the onus of proof. In many cases, as in Green, the 
reversal imposed by s67(8) would not meet the Oakes test if it were an 
express presumption set out in the offence itself. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that section 67(8) conflicts with section 
25( c) of the Bill of Rights, and it is not a justifiable limitation on the 
right to the presumption of innocence in a free and democratic society, 
meaning it is not saved by section 4 of the Bill of Rights. The section 
should be repealed. 
Bearing in mind the many and varied exhortations as to the importance 
of the right to be presumed innocent - starting with Lord Sankey's 
"golden thread" analogy and running through to the Human Rights 
Committee's statement that the right is "fundamental" and the 
Canadian Supreme Court's description of the right as a "hallowed 
principle",118 any provision which has the effect of reversing the legal 
burden of proof in vast numbers of different situations on an arbitrary 
basis surely cannot be acceptable. To uphold this type of provision is 
to reduce these statements to mere rhetoric, and the right itself to a 
hollow shell. Parliament knows perfectly well how to expressly reverse 
a burden of proof when it desires to do so; there is no need for blanket 
reversal provisions such as section 67(8). The only time a legal burden 
of proof should be placed on an accused is when Parliament explicitly 
118 Above n32, 212. lAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELl IJJCl L1"' 
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provides so ( and then only if the limit on the right to be presumed 
innocent is a justifiable one). 
3. Given that section 67(8) unjustifiably infringes section 25(c), what can a 
Court do? 
119 
120 
121 
122 
The first possible solution is for Courts to interpret section 67(8) as not 
imposing a legal burden on the accused when it applies, but merely an 
evidential burden. This has been suggested to be the correct meaning of 
section 67(8) in a recent article."119 No authority for this 
interpretation was cited, however, and such an interpretation directly 
conflicts with the decisions on the meaning of the section to date.120 
Following the Court of Appeal decision in Phillips121, which clearly held 
that the word "proof" is not capable of being interpreted as conferring 
merely an evidential burden, this interpretation would appear to be 
impossible. The best that can therefore be hoped for is a judicial 
declaration that section 67(8) infringes the right to the presumption of 
innocence and cannot be justified in a free and democratic society. Such 
a declaration would provide strong support for the various calls that have 
already been made for the section to be repealed.122 
While the section remains in force, however, it is incumbent upon the 
Courts to be constantly aware of section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights and 
accordingly to only allow section 67(8) to operate where there is clearly 
no alternative. In R v Oakes it was noted that the onus of proving that 
a right is limited is on the party seeking that limitation. Accordingly, the 
burden of proving that a provision does include an "exception, 
MA Kennedy, "Possession of Knives in Public Places• [1990] NZU 177. 
The leading case being Akehurst v Inspector of Quarries [1964] NZLR 621. 
Above n103. 
See, for example, E McDonald "Hunt, the Burden of Proof and the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990" NZU December 1992 432, 435; and J November 
"Burdens of Proof and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act s25( c)" NZU October 
1991 335, 336. 
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exemption, proviso, excuse or qualification" is on the prosecution (the 
standard of proof required being on the balance of probabilities). A 
finding that a provision does have this effect should not be reached 
lightly, given that the result will be a conflict with the Bill of Rights. 
The accepted test for determining whether a given part of a provision 
is part of the definition of the offence, or is a matter of "exception, 
exemption, proviso, excuse or qualification" prior to the House of Lords 
decision in R v Hunt123 was the "essence" test set out in Akehurst v 
Inspector of Quarries.124 In that case Richmond J adopted the 
following test from the decision in R (Sheahan) v Coric Justices: 125 
The test, or dividing line, appears to be this: Does the statute make an act 
described an offence subject to particular exceptions, qualifications, etc, which, 
where applicable, make the prima facie offence an innocent act? Or, does the 
statute make an act, prima facie innocent, an offence when done under certain 
conditions? In the former case the exception need not be negatived; in the latter, 
words of exception may constitute the gist of the offence. 
It is submitted that this test should continue to be the test used to 
determine whether or not a part of a provision is a matter of excuse, or 
an essential element of the offence itself, and that the less stringent test 
recently adopted by the House of Lords in R v Hunt126 should not be 
adopted in this country. On the Hunt test, where the form of the 
provision does not make it plain whether an element is one of excuse 
or exception etc, other factors must be looked at in the exercise of 
construing the statute, such as policy factors and the ease of proof. In 
this regard J.C. Smith has noted:127 
With great respect this does not seem to me the right approach. If Parliament 
has not made its intention clear, surely the presumption of innocence should 
123 Above n5. 
124 Above n120. 
125 [1907] 2 Ir.R 5. 
126 Above n5. 
127 J C Smith "The Presumption of Innocence" (1987) 38 Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 223. 
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prevail. To take into account the considerations mentioned by Lord Griffiths 
looks rather like forming a view as to where the court thinks Parliament ought 
to have put the burden of proof and then putting it there. This Lord Sankey 
would surely have regarded as a "whittling down• of the great principle which 
he enunciated in Woolmington . 
Smith's analysis is even more compelling in light of the Bill of Rights Act: 
the question cannot be one of looking at policy considerations and ease 
of proof where Parliament's intention as to the effect of part of the 
offence is unclear. If Parliament's intent is unclear, then it is possible to 
interpret the provision as one which does not involve an exception, 
exemption etc, and therefore the burden of proof remains on the 
prosecution. If this view is possible, section 6 of the Bill of Rights directs 
that this must be the interpretation given to the provision by the courts. 
This was the basis of the reasoning of the Court of Appeal m the 
decision in R v Rangi: 128 
"Section 25( c) stipulates that everyone charged with an offence has, as a 
minimum right, the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according 
to law; and s6 provides that wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that 
is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill, that meaning shall 
be preferred to any other meaning. In the face of that basic principle and of 
these directives, it is not immediately apparent that the policy considerations 
advanced by Mrs Martin, or the anomalies in the summary jurisdiction, amount 
to a sufficiently strong indication that the neutral language of subs 4( a) is to be 
understood as imposing an onus on the accused. It would have been a simple 
matter for Parliament to have made explicit reference to such a requirement ... 
Taking all these considerations into account we are satisfied that s202A( 4)( a) 
must be understood as defining an offence of having a knife in a public place 
without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, and in an indictable prosecution 
the Crown carries the onus of proof: if there is raised on the evidence an issue 
about the existence of such authority or excuse, the Crown must prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that it did not exist.• 
In order to comply with the Bill of Rights, whenever there is doubt as to 
the true effect of a part of a provision, that doubt must be resolved in 
favour of the accused by holding that the words in question form an 
element of the offence, and are therefore to be proved by the prosecution 
beyond reasonable doubt. To come to the opposite conclusion in 
(1992] 1 NZLR 385, 389. 
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uncertain cases, would contravene section 6 of the Bill of Rights which 
states that where more than one meaning is possible, that which is 
consistent with the Bill of Rights must be preferred. 
C. Common Law Reversal of Onus re Indictable Offences 
There is no parallel provision to section 67(8) of the Summary Offences Act, 
that applies to indictable offences. However, the House of Lords in R v Hunt 
has held that the English equivalent of section 67(8) simply set out the 
common law position in relation to exemptions, provisos etc, and that the rule 
applies equally to indictable offences. In that case, the accused was charged 
with possessing a controlled drug contrary to the Misuse of Drugs Act, the 
evidence establishing that he possessed a powder comprised of morphine ( a 
controlled drug) mixed with caffeine and atropine. Schedule 1 of the Act 
provided that the provision creating the offence of possession would not have 
effect in relation to any preparation containing not more than 0.2% of 
morphine. The case turned on who bore the burden of proving that the 
powder in the accused's possession contained more or less than 0.2% 
morphine. The prosecution alleged that the schedule created an exception 
from liability and the burden of proving that exception was on the accused. 
This argument was accepted in the Court of Appeal and the accused was 
convicted on the basis that the prosecution proved possession of morphine 
and the defendant had not proved the compound in question contained less 
than 0.2% morphine. On appeal to the House of Lords the conviction was 
overturned on the basis that the fact the compound must contain over 0.2% 
morphine was an essential element of the offence and not an exception at all, 
and therefore it must be proved by the prosecution. Accordingly the issue of 
who must prove statutory exceptions, exemptions etc was not essential to the 
decision in the case. Nevertheless the House of Lords went on to make far 
reaching obiter comments on this issue, which have had a devastating effect 
on the right to be presumed innocent in England. As noted above, the House 
of Lords opined that there is a common law rule to the effect that the 
accused bears the legal persuasive burden of proving statutory exceptions, 
exemptions, provisos, qualifications and excuses. 
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In coming to this conclusion the House of Lords widely interpreted what was 
meant by the words "any statutory exception" in the celebrated passage from 
Woolmington v DPP: 129 
Throughout the web of the English criminal law one golden thread is always to be seen, 
that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt subject to what I have 
already said as to the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory exception. 
The House of Lords held that a "statutory exception" need not be express, but 
may be implied into a statute. The result is that where a provision sets out an 
exception to what would otherwise be lawful, in the absence of clear words to 
the contrary, the burden of proof will be on the accused. Where the true 
construction of the statute is unclear, matters of policy and practical 
considerations - in particular the ease of proof - can be taken regard of in the 
exercise of construing the statute. It has already been argued above that this 
direction cannot apply in New Zealand in light of section 6 of the Bill of 
Rights, which compels a court to adopt the interpretation that accords with the 
rights in the Bill of Rights wherever such an interpretation is possible. 
The rule from Hunt cannot apply in New Zealand in the face of the Bill of 
Rights. The central premise that placing a legal burden on the accused to 
prove anything involves a breach of section 25(c) must not be lost sight of. It 
has already been argued above that a blanket rule purporting to shift a burden 
of proof onto an accused cannot be a justifiable limit of the fundamental right 
to be presumed innocent. The fact that that is done in a statute in relation to 
summary offences is problematic, because section 4 of the Bill of Rights 
precludes the striking down of statutes which conflict with the Bill of Rights. 
No such problem arises in relation to common law rules which must conform 
to the rights prescribed in the Bill of Rights (unless the limit on those rights 
imposed by the common law is a reasonable limit justifiable pursuant to 
section 5). The rule from Hunt cannot be justified, for the same reasons the 
section 67(8) blanket reversal of onus could not be justified. One reason for 
the conclusion that the burden of proof is the same for indictable and summary 
offences that was mentioned in both the main judgments in Hunt is the 
129 Above n2. 
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absurdity of the situation if the burden of proof were held to be different. 
The situation is undeniably absurd - but if we are to give effective protection 
to the right to be presumed innocent, surely what must be addressed to 
correct this absurdity is the repeal of the statutory rule m relation to 
summary offences as urged above, not the introduction of an equally 
abhorrent common law rule relating to indictable offences! The existence of 
the Bill of Rights statutory enactment of the right to be presumed innocent 
provides a valid ground for distinguishing the decision in Hunt which should 
be seized upon by New Zealand courts. 
To mend the "somewhat frayed" golden thread by holding that the 
persuasive legal burden never shifts to the defence in criminal proceedings, 
unless legislation expressly provides so, is the only avenue open to New 
Zealand courts that will be consistent with section 25( c) of the Bill of Rights. 
D. Strict Liability Offences 
1. Introduction 
The leading case which gave rise to the "strict liability" category of 
offence was the Canadian Supreme Court decision in R v City of Sault 
ste Marie. 130 In that case the city was charged with causing or 
permitting the discharge of materials into water which may affect the 
quality of that water under the Ontario Water Resources Act. The 
penalty was a fine of up to $5,000 for the first offence. For subsequent 
offences the penalty was a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment for 
one year, or both. The case resulted in the creation of a "half way 
house" between absolute liability and a requirement that mens rea ( or 
some "fault element") be proved in every case. In the strict liability 
category the prosecution must prove the actus reus, but the accused 
may escape liability if he or she proves that all due diligence was 
130 [1978] 2 SCR 1299. 
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exercised. In relation to the Woolmington affirmation of the presumption 
of innocence, Dickson J said:131 
It is to be noted that the case is concerned with criminal offences in the true 
sense; it is not concerned with public welfare offences. 
Following City of Sault ste Marie, public welfare offences became 
categorised as being prima facie in the strict liability category, unless the 
offence was worded in a way that indicated mens rea was required ( eg by 
the use of the words "wilfully" or "with intent"), or absolute liability was 
intended ( eg in cases where the language employed showed that "guilt 
would follow proof merely of the proscribed act"132). Other matters 
which are relevant when categorising offences were set out in that case, 
namely: 
• the overall regulatory pattern adopted by the legislature; 
• the subject matter of the legislation; 
• the severity of the penalty; and 
• the precision of the language used. 
In New Zealand the strict liability category of offence was adopted in the 
case of Department of Civil Aviation v MacKenzie.133 In that case, 
Richardson J noted:134 
In the case of public welfare regulatory offences ... a defence of total absence of 
fault is available unless clearly excluded in terms of the legislation. 
In Millar v Ministry of Transport135 the Court of Appeal established that 
there is a presumption against absolute liability where a provision is 
Above n130. 
Above n130, 374. 
[1983] NZLR 78. 
Above n133, 85. 
[1986] 1 NZLR 660. 
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silent as to the fault element required. Absolute liability will only apply 
where there is "clear legislative intent" .136 The Canadian Supreme 
Court has held that any offence that carries a penalty of imprisonment 
and does not permit, as a minimum, a defence of due diligence, is 
unconstitutional on the basis that it breaches the right to natural justice 
contained in section 7 of the Charter.137 
It is submitted that the enactment of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
requires a re-analysis of the burden of proof in relation to strict liability 
offences. The only burden on the accused in relation to the defence of 
total absence of fault can be an evidential burden. This is the natural 
result of the following conclusions, reached below: 
( a) the right to the presumption of innocence applies to public welfare 
offences; 
(b) that right is infringed when a legal burden of proof is placed on 
the accused to prove a defence; 
( c) the limit on the right which arises by placing the legal burden of 
proving total absence of fault on the accused cannot be justified 
pursuant to section 5 of the Bill of Rights. 
Before going on to illustrate each step of this argument, I note that the 
result of concluding the burden of proof must be an evidential burden 
only does not result in the abolition of the "half way house" of strict 
liability. Putting an evidential onus on the accused does not alter the 
standard that must be met in order to escape liability under a public 
welfare offence. The accused must still meet a higher standard than he 
or she would have to meet where an offence is a mens rea offence. In 
the latter case lack of knowledge will be a defence; but under the strict 
liability category an accused would have to provide some evidence that 
136 Above n135, 666. 
137 Reference re: s94(2) of Motor Vehicle Ad (British Columbia) 23 CCC (3d) 289; 24 
DLR ( 4th) 536. 
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he or she exercised "due diligence",138 which will involve showing the 
accused did "what a reasonable man would have done" .139 The 
requirement on the accused to adduce some evidence to show that this 
standard was reached provides a half-way house between mens rea and 
absolute liability, without offending against the Bill of Rights. 
2. Section 2S(c) Applies to Public Welfare Offences 
138 
139 
140 
Sections 24 and 25 of the Bill of Rights each commence with the words 
'Everyone who is charged with an offence .. .', and the heading of section 
25 refers to minimum standards of 'criminal' procedure. On a narrow 
construction of these words it could be argued that sections 24 and 25 are 
intended to apply only to persons charged with "true criminal offences", 
and that public welfare offences are distinguishable. However a narrow 
approach cannot be adopted when interpreting the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights. This point was forcefully made by Cooke P in R v Butcher & 
Burgess:140 
What can and should now be said unequivocally is that a Parliamentary 
declaration of human rights and individual freedoms, intended partly to affirm 
New Zealand's internationally proclaimed standards, is not to be construed 
narrowly or technically. 
The Bill of Rights is an Act designed to affirm New Zealand's 
commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
It is therefore imperative that the provisions of the Bill of Rights are 
interpreted by reference to the accepted meaning of the articles of the 
Covenant - to assign a meaning that results in lesser protection of a 
persons' rights would not be affirming our commitment to it. It has been 
clearly established that the word "offence" has an "autonomous" 
meaning under the Covenant; and that meaning encompasses all penal 
Above n133, 85. 
Above n133, 85. 
[1990-92] 1 NZBORR 59, 70. 
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matters, not merely "criminal" penal matters.141 The position is the 
same even where the word "offence" is preceded by the word 
"criminal" as in the marginal note to section 25.142 
The rejection of a narrow interpretation of the word 'offence' is further 
supported by tests devised under the Canadian Charter and the 
European Convention on Human Rights to decide what is a 'criminal 
offence' for the purposes of triggering the right to a fair trial. In the 
leading case of Engel and Others v the Netherlands (No 1)143, the 
European Court of Human Rights established certain principles relating 
to deciding whether or not a 'criminal charge' exists. 
Firstly, it noted that the Convention is not opposed to States 
maintaining a distinction between criminal law (which triggers the right 
to a fair trial) and disciplinary law (which does not), but this State 
classification will not be determinative for Convention purposes. To 
decide whether conduct breaches criminal law, or disciplinary law, the 
Court will look at the 'nature' of the offence and at the degree of 
severity of penalty that the accused risks incurring. It was noted in 
Engels case that deprivation of liberty as a punishment is generally a 
penalty belonging to the 'criminal' sphere.144 
S. Stavros, The Guarantees for Accused Persons under Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 1993) 
2-8. 
142 Elkind & Shaw, above nlO, 99. 
143 1 EHRR 647. 
144 Although this decision was confined to the area of offences at military service, the 
test for a 'criminal' charge (so as to trigger the right to a fair trial) has been adopted 
in later cases, including cases in non-military spheres, eg: Ozturk, (1984) 6 EHRR 
409; Campbell and Fell Case, (1985) 7 EHRR 165. 
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In Wigglesworth v R145 the Canadian Supreme Court held that an 
offence is a 'criminal offence' for the purposes of the Charter guarantees, 
if it meets the following criteria: 
(a) the offence is present in a matter of a 'public nature, intended to 
promote public order and welfare within a public sphere of 
activity'146 ( as opposed to a private, domestic or disciplinary 
matter which is primarily intended to maintain discipline, 
professional integrity and professional standards or to regulate 
conduct within a limited private sphere of activity); or 
(b) the offence is accompanied by a 'true penal consequence', which 
is defined as 'imprisonment or a fine which by its magnitude would 
appear to be imposed for the purposes of redressing the wrong 
done to society rather than the maintenance of internal discipline 
within the limited sphere of the activity.'147 
"Public welfare" offences clearly come under the first limb of the test for 
a "criminal offence" laid down in this case; and generally they will also 
come under the second limb, given that such offences are often 
punishable by imprisonment148 or a fine of such magnitude that it 
appears it is imposed to redress a wrong done to society. 
In the leading Canadian Supreme Court decision on the issue of the 
constitutionality of reversing the onus of proving due diligence in relation 
to public welfare offences, R v Wholesale Travel Limited, 149 two out of 
the nine strong bench did conclude that regulatory offences must be 
[1987] 2 SCR 541. 
Above n145, 560. 
Above n145, 561. 
Where an offence is punishable by imprisonment, Wilson J noted: •If an individual 
is to be subject to penal consequences such as imprisonment - the most severe 
deprivation of liberty known to our law - then he or she, in my opinion, should be 
entitled to the highest procedural protection known to our law.9 (p562). 
(1991) 67 CCC (3d) 193. 
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distinguished from criminal offences and the reversal of onus did not 
breach section 11( d) of the Charter in the case of regulatory offences. 
Cory J's judgment in this regard has been described as "extraordinary 
and utterly unconvincing." D. Stuart notes:150 
His Lordship rests heavily on a distinction between real and regulatory offences, 
which he tries very hard to defend. His major premise is that crimes involve 
punishing moral fault, but regulatory offences the protection of public and social 
interests. Mr Justice Cory does not seem to convince himself, since he admits 
that this is a theory which might be difficult to apply. This is an understatement. 
Many commentators and now the Law Reform Commission of Ontario have 
pointed to the difficulty of making a valid distinction based on the intrinsic nature 
of the acts prohibited as crimes and those punished as regulatory offences. How 
can one, for example, distinguish in advance between the conduct of one who is 
guilty of misleading advertising and one who fraudulently endorses a welfare 
cheque to get money to feed his or her children? Isn't pollution, presently 
classified as regulatory, morally wrong? How can one validly explain that some 
driving offences are under the Criminal Code of Canada and yet others are to be 
found under provincial Highway Traffic Acts? 
For all the above reasons, it is submitted that in order to affirm New 
Zealand's commitment to fundamental human rights in accordance with 
the long title to the Bill of Rights, "public welfare" offences must be 
considered to trigger the right to be presumed innocent provided in 
section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights. 
3. Section 25(c) is Infringed by Reversing the Onus in relation to Strict 
Liability Offences 
150 
The argument has already been made in Part I of this paper, but it 
bears repeating as it is a fundamental premise of this paper. The 
presumption of innocence applies until the stage where an accused is 
"proved guilty". This cannot merely mean the presumption applies 
until the Crown have prima facie established all essential elements of 
the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Although at this 
point of proceedings clearly an evidential onus is placed on the accused 
to provide some evidence capable of raising a doubt as to his or her 
guilt, the accused has not at this stage been proved guilty. If the 
accused in a public welfare offence is discharged at the end of the trial 
Above n99, 232. 
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because total absence of fault has been proved, he or she is not guilty of 
the offence charged. Prior to that point - that is, prior to the conclusion 
of the trial - the presumption of innocence will apply. To reverse the 
legal onus of proof in relation to proving part of the offence, or in 
relation to a defence, is to allow the Court to assume guilt, unless the 
accused can prove otherwise. Conviction will be possible despite the 
existence of a reasonable doubt as to guilt. Clearly this is not compatible 
with the right to the presumption of innocence. Thus to place a legal 
burden of proof on an accused at any stage of a trial, in relation to any 
matter, will breach the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty. 
Strict liability offences place a legal burden on an accused to prove that 
he or she exercised due diligence and that therefore the defence of total 
absence of fault is made out. The placement of this legal burden of 
proof on the accused infringes the right to the presumption of 
innocence.151 
The limit on the section 25(c) right is a creation of common law, dnd 
therefore cannot be saved by section 4 of the Bill of Rights. The only 
way a common law limit on a right under the Bill of Rights can be 
permitted is if it can be shown to be a justifiable limit under section 5. 
In R v Ellis Don152 it was held in both the Ontario Court of Appeal and 
the Supreme Court that placing a burden of proof on an accused at 
common law to prove the defence of due diligence on the balance of 
probabilities infringed Section 11( d) of the Charter. In reaching this 
conclusion it was decided that even though the legislation was only 
"quasi-criminal", Section ll(d) did apply and that the reversal of the 
onus breached Section 11( d). Similarly in R v Wholesale Travel153 
A Tuck-Jackson, "The Defence of Due Diligence and the Presumption of 
Innocence" (1990) 33 Criminal Law Quarterly 11, 30. 
(1990) 61 CCC (3d) 423. 
Above n149. 
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seven out of nine members of the Canadian Supreme Court held that 
placing a legal burden of proving the defence of due diligence in 
relation to public welfare offences, breaches the right to the 
presumption of innocence. (In both these cases, however, it was further 
held by the majority that the limit was a reasonable one, justifiable 
under section 1 of the Charter.) 
4. Is the Limit Justifiable? 
To meet the requirements of section 5 of the Bill of Rights as to what 
is a justifiable limit, a limit must be: 
( 1) reasonable; 
(2) prescribed by law; and 
(3) demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
The limit, being a rule of common law, is clearly "prescribed by 
law".154 The appropriate test as to whether the limit is also 
reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, 
is that outlined in Part I from Oakes:155 
The Canadian Supreme Court in R v Wholesale Travel have held, by a 
narrow five to four majority, that in the context of public welfare 
offences the reversal of the burden of proving the defence of due 
diligence is constitutional. It is notable that the reasoning behind the 
decisions in the case differed markedly. Two judges held that section 
11( d) of the Charter is not infringed at all by placing the burden of 
proof on an accused in the context of regulatory offences. Together 
with three judges who held section 11( d) was breached but the limit was 
justifiable, these formed the majority of five. The four remaining judges 
were united in finding that the burden on the accused to prove the 
defence of due diligence in regulatory offences infringed section 11( d) 
and could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter. 
154 Sunday Tunes v The United Kingdom 2 EHRR 245. 
155 Above, p32. 
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The Oakes analysis undertaken by those members of the bench that 
addressed the issue of whether the limit could be justified, was based on 
the specific legislation in question in the case. Despite this, comments 
were made about the constitutionality of placing the burden of proving 
the defence of due diligence on the accused in strict liability offences 
generally, and the case has been taken as being decisive of this broader 
issue. Bearing in mind that the Bill of Rights is an act to affirm New 
Zealand's commitment to the Covenant, it is submitted that New Zealand 
Courts must decline to apply the Oakes criteria as liberally as was done 
by the majority in this case. Set out below is an analysis of the rule 
relating to strict liability offences pursuant to the Oakes criteria, which it 
is submitted shows the reversal of onus cannot be justified pursuant to 
section 5 of the Bill of Rights. 
(a) The objective must be of suffident importance - The main reason 
for the adoption of the strict liability category of offence was to 
enable courts to "accord sufficient weight to the promotion of 
public health and safety without at the same time snaring the 
diligent and socially responsible."156 This general objective is 
undoubtedly a pressing and substantial social concern. 
In Wholesale Travel a broad formulation of the objective of the 
provision at issue was rejected for the purposes of the Oakes 
analysis, in favour of a more specific formulation. The case 
concerned a charge of false or misleading advertising, and while 
it was submitted that the objective of reversing the onus of proving 
a statutory defence of due diligence was to "promote vigorous and 
fair competition", the objective identified by the Court for 
reversing the onus of proof was "to ensure that all those that are 
guilty of false/misleading advertising are convicted and to ensure 
that convictions are not lost due to evidential problems in proving 
guilt...i57 This more specific objective can also be used to test 
Above nl33, 85. 
Above n149, 223. 
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the validity of reversing the onus in relation to public welfare 
offences generally, by substituting the words "public welfare 
offences" for the words "false/misleading advertising". Whether 
this more specific objective can be said to be sufficiently important 
to "warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or 
freedom" is debatable; although certainly it is a valid objective. 
However, it is not proposed to rest the case against the validity of 
the reversal of onus in strict liability offences on the lack of a 
sufficiently important objective. 
(b) The means chosen must be reasonable and demonstrably justifiable -
To meet the second limb of the Oakes test, a limit on a right must 
survive a three-pronged proportionality test, as follows: 
(i) The limit must be carefully designed to achieve the objective; 
it must be rationally connected - The means chosen to 
further the objective is to place the burden of proof of the 
defence of due diligence on the accused. In R v Wholesale 
Travel this method was described in terms of its effect:158 
158 Above n149, 223. 
• ... [the means] essentially amounts to a decision ... to convict 
all those who do not establish that they were duly diligent, 
including some accused who were duly diligent ( and for whom 
a reasonable doubt exists in that regard) but who are unable to 
prove due diligence on the balance of probabilities." 
While it is clear there is a rational connection between 
these means and the specific formulation of the objective 
noted above (namely, to ensure that all who are guilty are 
convicted); it is submitted there is no rational connection 
between these means and the original broad objective 
stated in R v City of Sault Ste Marie as being the reason for 
the creation of the strict liability category of offence. A 
decision to convict some accused that were duly diligent, 
but who are unable to prove that on the balance of 
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probabilities cannot be said to further the objective of 
"according sufficient weight to the promotion of public 
health and safety without at the same time snaring the diligent 
and socially responsible." (emphasis added). 
In R v Wholesale Travel the means adopted could be seen as 
rationally connected to both the specific objective discussed 
in the case, and also to the broad overall objective noted. 
However, when public welfare offences in general are 
considered, while the means adopted are clearly rationally 
connected to the specific objective, they are not rationally 
connected, and indeed are in part diametrically opposed, to 
the original broad objective of the limit. It is submitted that 
both the broad and specific formulations of the objective of 
a limit should be considered when determining the 
proportionality of that limit. 
Even disregarding the fact that a part of the objective for 
introducing the strict liability category of offence was to 
ensure the diligent and socially responsible were not 
convicted; the limit cannot be sustained. It is accepted that 
promoting public safety is an important objective, and it is 
further accepted that convicting all persons guilty of public 
welfare offences that did not exercise due diligence is a 
means of promoting that objective. However, it is contended 
that convicting most persons that are guilty of public welfare 
offences and who did not exercise due diligence; but allowing 
some to escape conviction because there is a reasonable 
doubt that they may have exercised due diligence, is also a 
valid means of achieving that objective. It is not accepted 
that the objective will be any better served by convicting all 
guilty persons and also some that were not guilty but were 
unable to establish they exercised due diligence. In the 
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absence of strong statistical evidence of this, no court should 
accept such an argument, in view of the fundamental nature 
of the human right that is at stake. 
(ii) The means should impair the right as little as possible - The 
objective of placing a high standard on persons in relation to 
public welfare offences, while at the same time not snaring 
the socially responsible, is met by the fact that there is but 
one defence: total absence of fault. This defence imposes the 
high standard that is necessary for public welfare offences, 
and allows those who exercised due diligence to escape 
liability. It is unnecessary to take the further step of placing 
a burden of proof on the accused. The objective is achieved 
by placing an evidential burden only on the accused. 
Accordingly, the means chosen are not means which impair 
the right as little as possible. .. 
The three judges in R v Wholesa/,e Travel that concluded the 
limit was justifiable, chose to analyse this requirement in a 
more liberal manner than that laid down in Oakes, relying on 
the decision in R v Chaulk:59 for authority to do so. In 
accordance with the lower threshold enunciated in that case, 
they held that Parliament could not have reasonably chosen 
an alternative means which would have achieved the objective 
"as effectively". It is submitted that efficacy cannot be the 
test for proportionality in analyses of the justifiability of a 
limit on a right. Such a low threshold test would render this 
component of the Oakes test totally redundant in presumption 
of innocence cases, because any violation by virtue of a 
reverse onus clause could be justified on this ground. Clearly 
no law that retains the burden of proof on the prosecution 
will operate "as effectively" as one that reverses the onus. 
Efficacy is too low a standard. 
159 [1990] 3 SCR 1303, 2 CR (4th) 1, 62 CCC (3d) 193. 
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In Wholesale Travel three judges were prepared to hold that 
the less intrusive means available for furthering the objective 
(namely, placing an evidential burden on the accused to 
bring forward evidence that due diligence was exercised) 
would make it 'virtually impossible" for Crown counsel to 
prove public welfare offences. It is notable that this 
sweeping conclusion was reached despite the absence of any 
statistical evidence in support.160 It must be remembered 
that section 5 of the Bill of Rights requires any party seeking 
to limit a right to be able to "demonstrably" justify that 
limitation. It is submitted that in the cases of strict liability 
cases, no demonstrable need can be shown for placing the 
persuasive burden of proof of the defence of due diligence 
on the accused. 
The view of the minority in relation to this part of the Oakes 
test is convincing: the imposition of a legal burden on the 
accused is not a means that infringes the constitutionally 
protected right to be presumed innocent as little as possible. 
Placing an evidential burden on an accused to bring forward 
evidence that due diligence was exercised is a less intrusive 
option that is available. The Ontario Law Reform 
Commission have recommended this option in relation to 
strict liability offences.161 
(iii) There must be proportionality between the effects of the limit 
and the objective - The right to be presumed innocent has 
been described by the Human Rights committee as 
"fundamental to the protection of human rights". As noted 
in the introduction, the travaux preparatoires relating to the 
right to the presumption of innocence in the Covenant 
C Ruby and K Jull ·The Charter and Regulatory Offences: A Wholesale 
Revision• 14 CR (4th) 226, 236; D Stuart, above n99, 233. 
·Report on the Basis of Liability for Provincial Offences• (1990); as cited in R v 
Wholesale Truvel, above n149, 224. 
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indicate that it was felt that this right was so important that 
it must be placed in a separate paragraph within the article 
relating to the right to a fair trial. Thus it can be seen that 
the right that is sought to be limited by this common law rule 
reversing the onus of proof, is widely recognised as very 
important. 
Further, the right is not limited in the least possible way; it 
is limited in a major way, given that a legal burden of proof 
is placed upon an accused. The issue can be reduced to one 
of who bears the risk of failure of proving the matter. When 
the prosecution bear the burden of proof, if they raise a 
reasonable doubt that the standard of due diligence was not 
reached, but fall short of proving this, it is possible an 
accused that was not duly diligent will be acquitted. On the 
other hand, when the accused bears the burden of proof, if he 
or she raises a reasonable doubt that the standard was 
reached, but fails to prove it, there is a possibility that an 
accused that did exercise due diligence will be convicted. 
Given that it has been determined that those who exercise 
due diligence ought not be convicted, this is an unacceptable 
result. 
To outweigh a serious limit on an important right, an 
objective would need to be extremely important. It is 
submitted that the need to convict all persons guilty of public 
welfare offences is not an objective weighty enough to justify 
this limit. Even the need to 'accord sufficient weight to the 
promotion of public health and safety without at the same 
time snaring the diligent and socially responsible' is arguably 
insufficient to justify the limit involved. 
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5. Conclusion 
It has been argued above that the reversal of onus of proving the defence 
of total absence of fault in strict liability offences violates the right to be 
presumed innocent in s25(c) of the Bill of Rights; and further, the 
reversal of onus in relation to such offences does not meet the Oakes test 
for determining reasonable limits, justifiable in a free and democratic 
society. 
Because the rule which imposes the burden of proof on an accused in this 
type of offence is a common law rule, it cannot be saved by section 4 of 
the Bill of Rights. Accordingly, it is submitted, New Zealand courts must 
reassess this half-way house category in light of the enactment of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights. 
6. 4nswel:\' to possible objections to making the burden an evidential one 
162 
There will undoubtedly be those who would oppose any shifting of the 
burden of proof from the accused to the prosecution in relation to strict 
liability offences. Accordingly, I now address some of the criticisms 
which are likely to be raised. 
+ "The strict liability offence provides the government with a practical 
method of imposing a high standard of care (that of the reamnable 
pen'on) on regulated entities. .Arguahfy, pen'ons are more likefy to 
maintain high standards of care if they know they will be prosecuted 
not onfy when they intend their acts, but also when their acts can be 
characterised as negligent." 162 
Altering the onus of proof in no way alters the standard which 
must be proved to have been met/breached. It merely alters who 
has to prove it and to what standard they must prove it; and 
K R Webb, Regulatory Offences, the Mental Element and the Charter: Rough Road 
Ahead, 21 Ottawa Law Review, 419, 421. 
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conversely who bears the risk of failure to prove it. The high 
standard of care which, on this argument, will be engendered by 
knowing that lack of knowledge is no defence, will still apply 
regardless of who bears the ultimate onus of proof. 
In this regard Lamer CJC in his dissenting judgment in R v 
Wholesale Trave/163 sets out the position well. Having cited and 
approved the Ontario Law Reform Commission's proposal that the 
burden of proof in relation to strict liability offences should be an 
evidential one, he continues: 
This will ensure that the information as to what steps, if any, were taken to 
avoid the occurrence of the prohibited act is in the record and will relieve 
the Crown of the obligation to bring forward evidence on a matter that is 
exclusively in the possession of the accused. On the other hand, the Crown 
will bear the risk of non-persuasion if the conclusions and inferences to be 
drawn from such information leave the trier of fact in a state of reasonable 
doubt on the issue of due diligence. 
+ "Given the accused's posi.tion of superior knowledge with respect to 
his or her own activities, and the informational disadvantage of the 
prosecution in this si.tuation, it is not capricious to suggest that raising 
a reasonable doubt would be an easier task for the accused in most 
situations than the prosecution." 164 
Putting an evidential onus on the accused would be requiring her 
to raise a reasonable doubt. This is not unreasonable. If this 
cannot be achieved, then a conviction will follow. Where the 
accused does succeed in raising such a doubt, however, then the 
onus of disproving total absence of fault will be on the 
prosecution. This is fair in situations where there is a reasonable 
doubt that there was a total absence of fault; given that it will 
have been decided that the offence is one where Parliament does 
not intend to punish those who are totally without fault. In this 
163 Above n149, 224. 
164 Above n162, 424. 
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regard the Ontario Law Reform Commission had the following to 
say:165 
... the fact the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused is 
not a satisfactory rationale for shifting the onus, since this is equally true 
of mens rea offences, where no such shift occurs. The accused's testimony 
is only one source of evidence. Experience has demonstrated that the 
Crown has had little difficulty establishing mens rea, as the trier of fact is 
entitled to draw reasonable inferences from all the evidence presented, 
whether or not the accused testifies. 
+ The presumption of uinocence is less relevant in a regulatory setting 
where objective negligence rather than subjective intent is the requisite 
mental element. 166 
It is submitted that any argument which purports to sweepingly 
remove an entire category of circumstances from the reach of 
fundamental human rights because those rights are "not relevant" 
must be examined very closely! Why is tlie presumption of 
innocence not relevant in the regulatory context? Why should the 
fact that "objective negligence" is the test of guilt mean an 
accused is any less deserving of the presumption that they are 
innocent of such objective negligence; than somebody accused of 
a "true crime" is deserving of the right to be presumed innocent 
on the basis of lack of subjective intent? If it has been decided 
that a defence of total absence of fault should apply to a provision, 
there is no good reason why, once a person provides evidence to 
show that there is reasonable doubt that he or she is not morally 
blameworthy because due diligence was exercised, that person 
should not have the benefit of being presumed to be innocent on 
that basis until the prosecution prove otherwise. The difficulty of 
articulating a rational basis for distinguishing between 
"regulatory" offences and true crimes noted above is a further 
As quoted by C Ruby and K Jull, above n160, 241. 
This was the basis on which Dickson J in City of Sault ste Marie distinguished 
Woolmington. 
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basis upon which the idea that the presumption of innocence does 
not apply to regulatory offences should be rejected. 
• It is ironic that the presumption of innocence, which is a principle for 
the benefit of the accused, should be used to justify the rejection of 
a defence of reasonable care for public welfare offences and the 
retention of absolute liability which affords the accused no defence 
at a/L 167 
In arguing that the burden of proof for strict liability offences 
should be on the prosecution in order to comply with the right to 
the presumption of innocence, it is not suggested that the defence 
of strict liability should be abolished. The half way house will 
remain: only the burden of proof will alter. 
• To alter the burden of proof is likely to result in more offences being 
categorised as absolute liability offences; which will in fact make 
matters more difficult for accused persons. 
It is submitted that altering the burden of proof must not alter the 
test for determining what offences are strict liability offences. 
Very clear wording will still be necessary to impose absolute 
liability. The Bill of Rights in fact lends strength to this: without 
very clear wording, Parliament cannot be assumed to have 
intended to contravene the rights in the Bill of Rights such as the 
right to be presumed innocent or the right to natural justice. 
Originally strict liability was lauded as being a half way house 
which would assist those accused of absolute liability offences, 
because many offences which had previously been categorised as 
absolute liability offences, could be upgraded into the strict 
liability category. However, the creation of the strict liability 
167 This is an adaptation of a statement by Dickson J in City of Sault ste Marie, 
above n130, 175. 
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category has in fact proved to have had an unanticipated downside 
which operates against accused persons. Case law has shown that 
in addition to some absolute liability offences being upgraded; 
many offences which had been in the mens rea category have been 
down graded into the strict liability category. 
• Reducing the burden on an accused to merely an evidential burden 
wil~ in practice, make it virtually impossible for the Crown to prove 
regulatory offences and would effectively prevent governments from 
seeking to implement public policy through regulatory means. 
168 
The problem with law enforcement expediency arguments is that 
they could be used to justify any reverse onus in relation to any 
crime.169 Undoubtedly there will be more convictions and the 
administration of criminal justice would be more efficient if we 
removed the requirement for the prosecution to prove mens rea in 
relation to all crimes. The point at issue is on what basis can the 
state justify imposing punishment on a person; the right to the 
presumption of innocence provides the answer to this - only when 
the state has proved his or her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 
Questions of administrative efficiency cannot be used to justify 
breaches of this fundamental human right. 
It is submitted that imposing an evidential burden on an accused will not 
derogate from the objectives which lead to the creation of the half-way 
house: there will still be an incentive to comply with public welfare 
legislation because the only way to escape liability will be to provide 
some evidence that due diligence was exercised. If due diligence was not 
exercised, an accused will be unable to adduce evidence to create a 
reasonable doubt that it was. Making the burden merely an evidential 
onus only will, however, mean the Bill of Rights is not infringed. An 
evidential onus on an accused to raise a defence does not breach the 
Above n149, 256 (per Cory J). 
Above n99, 229. 
The Right to the Presumption of Innocence 
right to the presumption of innocence. It is submitted that this is the 
course New Zealand courts must follow if they are to comply with the 
Bill of Rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The presumption of innocence is a hallowed principle lying at the very heart of criminal law . 
... The presumption of innocence protects the fundamental liberty and human dignity of any 
and every person accused by the state of criminal conduct. An individual charged with a 
criminal offence faces grave social and personal consequences, including potential loss of 
physical liberty, subjection to social stigma and ostracism from the community, as well as other 
social, psychological and economic harms. In light of the gravity of these consequences, the 
presumption of innocence is crucial. It ensures that until the State proves an accused's guilt 
beyond all reasonable doubt, he or she is innocent. This is essential in a society committed 
to fairness and social justice. The presumption of innocence confirms our belief in humankind; 
it reflects our belief that individuals are decent and law-abiding members ofthe community 
until proven otherwise. 
RV Oakes110 
The presumption of innocence is violated regularly in New Zealand courts. The 
enactment of the Bill of Rights has created the opportunity to redress this situation. 
This paper has identified the approach that New Zealand courts should adopt in 
determining questions of whether a reversal of an onus infringes the right to be 
presumed innocent. It has also identified some specific ways in which section 25(c) 
can be relied on to "retwine" Lord Sankey's "somewhat frayed"171 golden thread. 
Section 25(c) cannot be regarded as simply a continuation of the common law rule 
relating to the presumption of innocence. It is a provision that can, and should, 
have a profound effect on New Zealand law. 
[70 Above n32, 212-213. 
17l Above n3. 
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